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Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit its Annual Report
covering the period from February 1993 through January 1994. The report contains
findings, recommendations, and supporting material; however, we ask that you respond
only to Section II, "Findings and Recommendations."
Over the past year, we have appreciated the support you have shown for our work
through your careful consideration of our previous analyses and recommendations and
the several special assignments you have given us. We have explored topics such as the
impact of demanding schedules, Structured Surveillance, and cost reductions on launch
processing; orbital debris; Space Shuttle main engine fabrication and processing; and
NASA's response to the National Research Council's report on Space Shuttle software.
We also have reviewed a number of NASA's aeronautics programs. We have kept
abreast of developments with the Space Station, although our normal safety oversight
activities were impossible given the Station's state of flux throughout the year.
We enter the new year with continued admiration for the successful NASA team but
with some significant concerns about potential problems. While we realize that NASA
must respond to imposed budgetary constraints, we are uncomfortable about deferring
needed safety improvements such as the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump. We also are
concerned about organizational changes that could impact the safety of NASA's
programs. Finally, now that a firm direction for the Space Station has been established,
we wish to obtain a better understanding of any safety implications inherent in the
integration of elements of the Russian space program because we understand that it has
heretofore adopted a somewhat different design approach and safety philosophy from
those of NASA.
The ASAP will continue its advisory role to you and the Congress in the upcoming year
by providing safety oversight to assist in minimizing the risks inherent in aeronautics and
space operations.
Norman R. Parmet
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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I. INTRODUCTION

IINTRODUCTION
The success of the complex Hubble Space
Telescope repair mission capped a year of
major transition for NASA. In a period of
severe budget cutbacks and organizational
change, the Space Shuttle continued its
successful operations, although it experienced
numerous minor problems. The decision
to enter a partnership with the Russian space
program for the development of a space
station will have a profound impact on the
way the station's and NASA's futures evolve.
Aeronautics research programs also
continued their significant advances.
As in previous years, the role of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
was one of oversight and counsel to the
NASA Administrator and the Congress on
the safety aspects of the various programs.
Fulfilling this role over the past year was
both challenging and frustrating. Changes
in the Space Shuttle and Space Station
programs during the year made it difficult
for the Panel to determine where to devote
its attention. The Panel decided it was best
to defer looking at the transitioning
programs and to focus its primary efforts
on the continuing launch processing activities
at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and
several special assignments requested by the
Administrator. These included a review of
the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
manufacturing processes, an audit of NASA's
response to the National Research Council's
report on Space Shuttle software, a review
of the implications of cost reductions on the
safety of launch processing at KSC, and a
review of NASA and contractor Total
Quality Management (TQM) programs.
Notably absent from the Panel's efforts
during the year was a detailed focus on the
Space Station or the Advanced Solid Rocket
Motor (ASRM). Both programs were in
a state of flux throughout the year. As this
report was being written, however, clear
directions for the upcoming year appear to
have emerged. Because the ASRM program
has been canceled, future Panel efforts will
be directed towards the Redesigned Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM) and possible
incorporation of safety and performance
improvements from the ASRM development
effort.
The decision to pursue joint space programs
with the Russians raises several areas of
possible safety concern. These include the
integration of hardware and software from
two operations with somewhat different
philosophies, outlooks, and constraints, and
the methods available for generating and
verifying requirements. Thus, the Panel will
place particular emphasis on the joint
programs during the upcoming year.
NASA continues to demonstrate a strong
commitment to safety. The processes and
procedures in place have resulted in highly
successful Space Shuttle missions. They also
have been effective in identifying and dealing
with technical anomalies that have arisen.
The potential impacts on safety of
organizational and budgetary changes will
be significantly more difficult to assess. The
Panel will have to take these changes into
account so that it can continue to provide
safety oversight to the Agency. The ASAP
is confident that, working cooperatively with
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NASA and contractor personnel, it will be
able to help minimize risk in our nation's
aerospace programs.
Section II presents "Findings and
Recommendations." Section III provides
"Information in Support of Findings and
Recommendations" for readers interested
in more details. Appendices in Section IV
contain data about the Panel membership,
the NASA response to the March 1993
ASAP report, and a chronology of the
Panel's activities during the past year.
As the year came to a close, Mr. Arthur V.
Palmer retired from NASA and his position
as Staff Director of the Panel. He was
replaced in this position by Mr. Frank L.
Manning.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION PROGRAM
l_nding Ill: Joint U.S. and Russian space
programs, including the Space Station, are
now underway. Potential safety concerns
arising from these collaborative efforts have
not yet been completely defined or ad-
dressed.
Recommendation Ill: Safety requirements
for the joint programs should be established
from a thorough understanding of the
underlying policies of design, test, and review
in use by each country. Timely total systems
analyses should be conducted to ensure
adequate safety of components and inter-
faces as well as overall system safety.
l_indine #2: Much good work has been done
to assess the impact of space debris on the
long-duration mission of the Space Station,
and significant accomplishments have been
made in developing shielding to protect the
Station. However, there is still insufficient
information on the probability that pene-
trations will have a catastrophic effect.
Recommendation Il2: To support effective
risk management, NASA should continue
its emphasis on space debris problems,
including a better characterization of the
risk of catastrophic failures and an assess-
ment of the capability to add shielding on-
orbit.
l_nding #3: Consideration is being given
to maneuvering the Space Station to avoid
larger debris that are capable of being
tracked. Such maneuvers raise concerns
about Station structural dynamics, disruption
of the microgravity environment, and the
ability of existing or planned systems to
provide adequate debris tracking data.
Recommendation t/3: Before adopting any
maneuvering option, care must be taken to
ensure that the dynamics of operation,
including their effects on hardware, e.g.,
solar and radiator panels, and their influence
on microgravity experiment operations, are
considered. Realistic evaluation must also
be made of the ability of ground-based and
on-orbit systems to support maneuvering
options with adequate debris tracking.
Finding II4; Present plans for rescue of
Space Station personnel are not fully defined
and may prove unsatisfactory without more
precise and detailed planning, including
necessary training and restrictions on the
Station population.
Recommendation #4: NASA should
reexamine current plans to ensure that they
meet the required safety criteria. If they
do not, priority should be given to the
protocols necessary to ensure rescue of the
entire Station crew if the Station must be
evacuated.
B. SPACE SHU'VIq.,E PROGRAM
binding #5: The organization and man-
agement of Space Shuttle launch operations
at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) continue
to benefit from a "continuous improvement
process" managed by the Shuttle Processing
Contractor (SPC). Greater employee
involvement, better communications,
strengthened employee training and the use
of task teams, process improvement teams,
and a management steering committee have
been major factors in this improvement.
Recommendation #5: A strong commitment
to achieving "continuous improvement,"
despite budget cutbacks, should be
maintained, at the same time recognizing
the paramount priority of safety.
bindine #6- More than 1,200 positions have
been eliminated by the SPC since September
1991 with only about 22 percent being
achieved through involuntary separations.
Present reductions have been achieved
without an apparent adverse effect on the
safety of launch processing. A comparable
further reduction has been called for by the
end of FY 1995. These additional reductions
cannot likely be made without a higher
probability of impacting safety.
Recommendation H6: KSC and SPC
management must be vigilant and vocal in
avoiding any unacceptable impacts on safety
as a result of cost reductions planned for
FY 1995 and beyond.
Nnding #7: Several Space Shuttle processing
problems at KSC have been attributed to
human factors issues. KSC has recently
formed a human factors task force to address
these problems.
Recommendation #7: KSC should ensure
that the human factors task force includes
individuals with training and experience in
the field. Specific assistance should be
sought from appropriate research centers
and technology groups within NASA.
bTnding #8: KSC has developed a Structured
Surveillance Program with the objectives
of decreasing overall process flow time,
increasing "first-time quality," and reducing
cost. The program approach involves
reducing the reliance on inspections for
assuring quality. Structured Surveillance
also is proving valuable as a tool for the
effective deployment of quality assurance
resources.
Recommendation #8." The Structured
Surveillance program should be continued
and cautiously expanded.
O_!_R
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
binding #9: Thermal damage was noted on
the STS-56 (OV-103) elevon tiles. The
slumping of the tiles indicated that the tile
surface reached a temperature of approxi-
mately 1,000 ° F. A temperature of this
magnitude suggests that the temper and
strength of the underlying aluminum
structure could have been affected.
Recommendation #9: NASA should initiate
an analysis to determine the temperature
profile of the underlying aluminum structure
of the elevons and its possible consequences
on the strength of the Orbiter structure.
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Finding #10." The Shuttle tiles have provided
effective heat protection. However, the
surface of the tiles is easily damaged and
their shrinkage and distortion properties are
not as low as desired. A new tile
formulation with superior characteristics and
possibly lower density is being explored.
Recommendation #10; NASA is encouraged
to support the development of thermal
protection tiles with improved mechanical
properties and lower density than the current
Shuttle tiles.
Finding #11: NASA has made excellent
progress on the engineering of the
Multipurpose Electronic Display System
(MEDS) for retrofitting Orbiter displays.
However, there is no formal program to
identify and include the safety advantages
possible from a fully exploited MEDS.
Recommendation Nil: A thorough review
of the performance and safety improvements
possible from a completely developed MEDS
should be conducted based on crew inputs
to system designers and researchers. A
definitive plan should be developed to
determine the schedule/cost implications
of such improvements, and, if warranted,
implementation should be scheduled as soon
as possible.
Finding #12: The Improved Auxiliary Power
Unit (IAPU) has experienced problems that
have impacted Space Shuttle processing and
logistics.
Recommendation #12: A new focus on
increasing the reliability of the total IAPU
system should be initiated and supported
until the identified problems are solved.
Finding #13: In its response to the Panel's
last Annual Report, NASA indicated that
'The program is reviewing the operational
flight rules pertaining to Autoland, we have
budgeted upgrades in software and hardware
to improve the Autoland functionality, the
life sciences organization is collecting
physiological data and developing
countermeasures to ensure adequate crew
performance as the mission duration
increases. We are confident with using
Autoland in a contingency mode, but do not
plan to demonstrate Autoland until a firm
requirement mandates a demonstration."
Recommendation #13: The focus of
Autoland should not be exclusively on long-
duration missions. NASA should formulate
a complete set of operational procedures
needed for emergency use of Autoland,
taking into account a full range of
operational scenarios and equipment
modifications that might be beneficial.
These include upgrades to the Microwave
Scanning Beam Landing System (MSBLS)
receiver group, and installation and
certification of Global Positioning System
(GPS) capability.
Finding #14: The SSME has performed well
in flight but has been the cause of launch
delays and on-pad launch aborts that were
primarily attributable to manufacturing
control problems.
Recommendation #14: Continue to
implement the corrective actions developed
by the NASA and Rocketdyne manufacturing
process review teams and devise techniques
for detecting and/or precluding recurrence
of the types of problems identified.
Finding #15: "Sheetmetal" cracks in the
Phase II (current) High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump (HPFTP) have become more
frequent and are larger than previously
experienced. This has led to the imposition
of a 4,250-second operating time limit and
a reduction of allowable crack size by a
factor of four. Congress has delayed the
funding for restarting the development of
the alternate HPFrP. This new turbopump
design should eliminate the cracking
problem.
Recommendation #15: Restart the
development and certification of the
alternate HPFTP immediately.
The approved parts of the
engine component improvement programs,
now organized into block changes, are
progressing well. The Block I grouping will
enter formal certification testing by mid-
1994. Progress in the Block II effort is,
however, hampered by the delay in restarting
the alternate HPFTP development effort.
Recommendation #16: Continue efforts to
complete a//of the Block II development
as soon as possible.
binding #17: Engine sensor failures have
become more frequent and are a source of
increased risk of launch delays, on-pad
aborts, or potential unwarranted engine
shutdown in flight.
R¢convnendation #17: Undertake aprogram
to secure or develop and certify improved,
more reliable engine condition sensors.
Finding #18: The SSME health monitoring
system comprising the engine controller and
its algorithms, software, and sensors is old
technology. The controller's limited
computational capacity precludes incor-
poration of more state-of-the-art algorithms
and decision rules. As a result, the
probabilities of either shutting down a
healthy engine or failing to detect an engine
anomaly are higher than necessary.
Recommendation #18: The SSME program
should undertake a comprehensive effort
to improve the capability and reliability of
the SSME health monitoring system. Such
a program should include not only improved
sensors but also a more capable controller
and advanced algorithms.
binding #19: A segment of an aft skirt will
be used to test the effectiveness of an
external bracket modification in reducing
the overall bending stress of the skirt. The
validity of using an l 1-inch-wide test
specimen to determine the effectiveness of
the bracket is yet to be demonstrated.
Recommendation tf19¢ NASA should
evaluate the first specimen test results to
see if the strains in the weld area duplicate
the strains found when a full aft skirt was
tested in the Static Test Article-3 (STA-3)
test. If not, another test approach should
be pursued.
binding #20: A small crack was found in
the inner wall of a forward Redesigned Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM) casing used for STS-
54. Although slightly above the specified
minimum detectable size, it was well within
the acceptable limits for safe flight. This
was the first time that a crack had been
found in a forward segment, although cracks
have previously been detected in other
segments. The crack occurred during the
manufacturing heat treatment process
because of an inclusion in the parent
material.
Recommendation #20: The X-ray and
magnetic particle inspection program criteria
should be re-evaluated to assess their ability
to detect cracks of the size found.
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Findin¢ #21: The Advanced Solid Rocket
Motor (ASRM) project has been canceled.
Some elements from the ASRM develop-
ment have possible reliability and/or per-
formance benefits if they were applied to
the RSRM.
Recommendation #21: Examine the potential
applicability and cost-effectiveness of
including selected ASRM design features
in the RSRM.
Finding//22: A chamber pressure excursion
of 13 psi (equivalent to a thrust perturbation
of 54,000 pounds) occurred in one of the
RSRMs of STS-54 at 67 seconds of motor
operation. A thorough investigation of the
phenomenon was initiated and found that
the most probable cause was the expulsion
of a "slug" of liquid slag (aluminum oxide)
generated during normal propellant
combustion. Analyses showed that, even
under statistical worst-case conditions, the
safety of the Shuttle system is not
compromised by such perturbations. Some
testing and analyses are still scheduled to
complete the investigation.
Recommendation #22: Complete and
document the investigation, and continue
the established practice of monitoring
chamber pressures and examining possible
remedial actions.
Finding #23: A Super Light Weight External
Tank (SLWT) has been proposed as a means
of increasing the payload performance of
the Space Shuttle. The tank would employ
structural changes and be made from an
Aluminum-Lithium (Al-Li) alloy. The
SLWT appears to involve no safety decre-
ment and low technical risk.
Recommendation #23: The impact of the
SLWT on the total system should be care-
fully examined.
Finding #24: The Integrated Logistics Panel
(ILP), which meets at 6-month intervals to
report and coordinate the activities of the
NASA Centers and their contractors, is
performing a vital service in helping to
control the entire Space Shuttle logistics
program.
Recommendation #24: The ILP should
continue to be supported as an effective
means of maintaining control and coordi-
nation of the entire logistics program.
Finding #25: The Vision 2000 cost-reduction
program promulgated in May 1993 includes
some major changes in the logistics and
support areas.
Recommendation #25: All changes that
might impair logistics and support functions
in the name of cost-cutting should be most
carefully reviewed before implementation.
Finding #26: Introduction of the Just-In-
Time (JIT) manufacturing and shelf-stocking
concept by NASA logistics at KSC is a
potentially effective method of cost
control.
Recommendation #26: JIT should be used
with caution and with a thorough under-
standing of how it may impact the availability
of Space Shuttle spares and hardware
supplies.
Finding #27: A review of the main logistics
system performance parameters indicates
that the program is generally performing
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effectively. There are minor problems with
zero balances, and repair turnaround times
appear to be worsening. Cannibalization,
with the exception of the IAPU, is at a
minimum. Because of manufacturing and
assembly quality problems, the number of
spare engines is at a minimum and could
become a logistics problem.
Recommendation #27: Additional emphasis
should be focused on repair turnaround time
improvement and the reduction of canni-
balization of SSME and IAPU components.
NASA should continue the efforts to
improve SSME manufacturing control and
quality processes to preclude future engine
availability problems.
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C. AERONAUTICS
The Dryden Flight Research
Facility (DFRF) does not presently have a
range safety policy and system for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such
as the Perseus, which is about to enter
extensive testing. A working group under
the DFRF Chief Engineer is examining the
issue.
Recommendation #28: DFRF should develop
a range safety policy and system that are
adequate to cover its contemplated UAV
projects.
binding #29: The DFRF flight safety and
mission assurance organization now reports
directly to the Director of the facility.
Recommendation #29: None.
binding #30: The X-31 aircraft exhibited
some undesirable stability characteristics at
higher subsonic speeds and an unexpected
departure during a high angle of attack test.
It also carries an insufficient quantity of
hydrazine to run its emergency power unit
long enough to return to the Edwards
runway from the typically used flight test
site.
Recommendation #30: Future test objectives
for the X-31 should be based on an
assessment of the specific program objectives
that can only be uniquely and safely per-
formed by this aircraft.
OP,l_tr',!AL P_G_
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D. OTHER
NASA's past approach to
software development has been to
incorporate it within the individual programs,
allowing them to determine their own
requirements and development, verification,
and validation procedures. In the future,
as the complexity of NASA's computer
systems and the need for interoperability
grow, this mode of operation will be
increasingly less satisfactory. While NASA
has some good software practices, it does
not have the overall management policies,
procedures, or organizational structure to
deal with these complex software issues.
Recommendation #31: NASA should proceed
to develop and implement an Agencywide
policy and process for software development,
verification, validation, and safety as quickly
as possible.
NASA has consolidated Life
and Microgravity Sciences and Applications,
including human factors in NASA Head-
quarters Code U. A Space Human Factors
& Engineering Program Plan is being pre-
pared to guide future research activities.
There remains, however, a clear need for
more opemt/otud human factors input in both
the Space Shuttle and Space Station
programs.
Recommendation #32: The Program Plan
should be expanded to include support of
the operating space flight programs to ensure
that sufficient human factors expertise is
included.
l_tuting H33: There are excellent examples
of Total Quality Management (TQM)
principles and practices in various contractor
and NASA activities.
Recommendation N33: NASA and contractor
management should use the existing effective
TQM implementations as models for their
continuing TQM efforts.
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INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION PROGRAM
Ref: Finding #1
The Space Station program has been in a
state of flux for most of the year, and now
incorporates components and hardware
designed and manufactured in Russia. The
decision has also been made to place the
Space Station in a higher inclination orbit
so that it can be reached from both nations'
launch facilities. In addition, a Shuttle-Mir
rendezvous and docking and
astronaut/cosmonaut exchange program has
been initiated and is in the hardware
manufacturing stage. These changes could
have profound impacts on the entire life
cycle of operations. These impacts must be
carefully studied now so that sufficient
provisions are made for them in the Space
Station and Space Shuttle programs. Activity
has been so rapid that there has been little
opportunity to examine information about
the design and operating philosophies of the
two countries that pertain to safety, e.g.,
structural design margins, redundancy
policies, systems integration, operating
priorities, and environmental test specifi-
cations. Also, the philosophy for Station
crew emergency egress and return to Earth
in the event of a major catastrophe remains
of concern and should be reexamined in light
of the new design.
The requirements for the joint programs
should be established from a thorough
understanding of the underlying policies of
design, test, and review in use by each
country. Timely end-to-end systems analyses
should be conducted to ensure adequate
safety of components and interfaces.
Adequate attention should be given to
lessons learned from previous collaborations
on Apollo-Soyuz and the more recent
experience from U.S./Russian commercial
aircraft integration efforts.
Ref: Findings #2 and #3
The Space Station Program has recognized
that the hazard of possible impact with
orbital debris cannot be ignored given the
large size of the Station and the planned
long period on-orbit. Accordingly, a
specification of a probability of no
penetration (PNP) from such impact of 0.95
for a mission duration of 10 years was
established. This duration represents a
reduction from the originally planned Station
life of 30 years. The Space Station, because
of its large size, long mission life, and orbital
altitude, is at greater risk than previous
missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), and it
is not certain whether the probability
requirements can be met.
An orbital debris program has been
underway for a number of years with the
objectives of defining" the environment,
developing models, developing shielding
concepts, and maintaining a data base.
NASA, in conjunction with other agencies
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around the world, has compiled a
comprehensive catalog of known objects in
space with a diameter larger than 10-20 cm.
In addition, they have developed detailed
models of the distribution of debris of
diameters less than 10 cm in terms of
particle flux of various sizes as a function
of altitude and latitude. These models can
be combined with orbital data and the
projected area and functional lifetime of a
spacecraft to yield a probability of impact
and an estimate of the mass and velocity
of the impacting body. Hypervelocity test
programs, carried out by NASA and other
agencies, allow these data to be turned into
damage assessments of structures, pressure
vessels, and other vulnerable portions of a
spacecraft.
The flux of orbiting debris depends on
several physical factors that make the
environment vary, creating considerable
uncertainty over time. The principal factor
that serves to remove debris from orbit is
the retarding force of the drag that is
proportional to the area-to-mass ratio of the
debris object and to the density of the
atmosphere. The latter varies over time,
driven largely by the 11-year cycle of solar
energy -- the "sunspot cycle." The principal
debris-increasing factor is the launch of new
satellites and their accompanying rocket
bodies, and other mission-related objects.
To put this in perspective, the orbital
lifetime at an altitude of 200 km can vary
from a few months to over 10 years. At
altitudes of 1,000 to 1,500 km, the life can
exceed 1,000 years. Orbital debris flux is
several times what was predicted 7 to 10
years ago and is increasing at a rate of 2
to 5 percent per year. Given the great
changes in Station design and configuration
and the uncertainties involved, the analyses
to date for PNP and probability of no
catastrophic failure (PNCF) are only
rudimentary. Therefore, the real risks are
not yet well understood. Also, given the cost
and work involved in developing the Station,
it may be unduly limiting to base risk
analyses on a life of only 10 years. The
Program should also explore longer lifetimes.
The vulnerability of spacecraft surfaces to
penetration by debris can be mitigated by
shielding. Extensive, high-quality work has
been done on developing shielding techni-
ques to protect against objects of small
diameter, e.g., 1 to 1.5 cm, at an average
relative velocity of 10 km/sec. The initial
shield design for the Station (0.050-inch thick
aluminum bumpers with 4.5-inch standoff
from an 0.125-inch aluminum manned
module pressure wall) meets the present
PNP requirements. Several advanced shield
trade studies are being initiated to provide
penetration protection, maintain schedule,
and minimize launch weight for manned and
unmanned critical elements. The launch
weight can also be managed by augmenting
shields on-orbit. It would seem prudent to
give careful consideration to shielding
designs that allow for the addition of debris
protection on-orbit. It must also be noted
that there is a range of debris, roughly 1-2
cm up to 10-20 cm in diameter, for which
adequate means of protection do not
presently exist.
It is reasonable to assume that not all
penetration events will result in catastrophic
failures, as the earlier studies had assumed.
Studies show (for Space Station Freedom)
that if the PNP of 0.95 is interpreted as a
PNCF, it is equivalent to a PNP of 0.90.
The allocation of PNP to modules depends
on the severity of the consequences of
penetration in each individual area. The
allocation of PNP for each of the critical
elements varies from 0.9920 to 0.9955 for
the modeled configuration. Meeting these
requirements could present severe weight
and cost penalties as well as schedule
constraints.
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Further work is needed on fracture
mechanics response of pressure vessels to
hypervelocity impacts to determine which
impacts would result in self-propagating
cracks. The critical crack length for constant
thickness aluminum skin is well charac-
terized. However, the crack length for the
waffle construction planned for the current
design requires further analysis and testing.
Unfortunately, FY 1993 funding for this type
of fracture testing at MSFC has been frozen.
In addition, detailed analyses need to be
conducted of crew injury or loss of Station
due to critical element penetration. Such
elements will include manned elements and
stored energy elements, with the manned
elements requiring many assumptions on
crew location and reaction. Tests are
required to verify crew egress time and
depressurization limit assumptions. The
problem is multidimensional, requiring a
particular focus on structural analysis and
crew factors. Optimum solutions will depend
on weight and schedule limitations. Careful
consideration should be given to developing
realistic scenarios of crew condition and
possible response behavior as a function of
the nature of various relevant penetrations.
On the one hand, worst case analyses may
lead to requirements that are too restrictive
and costly. A failure to be sufficiently
conservative, on the other hand, can expose
the crew to unreasonable risk.
A collision avoidance scheme involving
ground radar tracking of potential impactors
and maneuvering the Station to avoid impact
has been proposed and may be technically
feasible. Existing radar nets, however, are
limited by geographic location and wave-
length considerations to tracking objects 20
cm and larger (equivalent radar cross-
section) in LEO. Ability to detect, track,
and catalog debris falls off rapidly below
10 cm for these systems, which were not
designed for this purpose. Because space-
craft are vulnerable to serious damage from
objects as small as 0.5 cm, such a scheme
is only partially effective without greatly
improved and potentially very expensive
enhanced radar capability and added
operational tracking personnel and
equipment. Maneuvering of the Station also
imposes dynamic effects on deployed solar
and radiation panels and on microgravity
experiment operations.
Ref: Finding #4
The Panel's review did not uncover any
detailed plan for rescue of Space Station
personnel from the combined revised U.S.
Space Station in the event of a catastrophic
event. While acknowledging that Station
plans have been in great flux this past year,
information available to the Panel indicates
that rescue plans center on either the
continuous presence of an Orbiter or one
or more small capacity Soyuz capsules. Both
schemes are presently vague, giving rise to
concern that neither will prove satisfactory
without more precise and detailed planning,
including necessary training and restrictions
on Station population.
NASA should determine the extent to which
current plans meet the necessary safety
criteria. To the extent they do not, priority
should be given to constructing the protocols
necessary to ensure rescue of the entire
Station crew in the event of any credible
need to evacuate the Station. Where
pertinent, the excellent groundwork repre-
sented by the requirements analysis for
NASA's Assured Crew Return Vehicle
(ACRV) should be utilized.
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B. SPACE SHUFFLE PROGRAM
Ref. Finding #5
The Panel has been following Space Shuttle
launch processing for more than a decade.
This predates the selection of Lockheed
Space Operations Company as the Shuttle
Processing Contractor (SPC). From this
extended perspective, it is clear that
considerable progress has been achieved in
evolving a more reliable, orderly, efficient,
and safe process. In particular, both
management and workforce are committed
to the proposition of "safety first, schedule
second," as well as to the development of
improved management procedures that build
a greater sense of personal responsibility
and pride among personnel. The principal
challenge facing NASA and SPC manage-
ment is to carry on this commitment to
continuous improvement in the face of
sharply reduced operating budget forecasts
for the years beyond FY 1995 and externally
imposed constraints.
The number and severity of Space Shuttle
processing incidents continued a downward
trend in FY 1993. A total of 20 incidents
were reported from October 1992 through
September 1993. Eight were attributed to
human error, seven to procedures
(permanent changes to the procedures are
planned to eliminate the deficiencies), one
to equipment breakdown, three to design
deficiencies (in each case, a design change
has been made or is in process), and one
unknown. For July, August, and September
1993, the human error rate dropped to zero.
Data on incident/accident frequencies during
processing reveal no apparent correlations
between frequency of incidents and work
location, day of week, or particular shift.
Since FY 1988, the number of labor hours
required for Space Shuttle launch processing
has been cut in half. Factors accounting for
this decrease include continuing reductions
in non-standard work, gradual elimination
of overtime, maturing of task teams, greater
predictability in work schedules, fewer
unplanned events, and a greater experience
base among the workforce. Most parts for
planned work in the Orbiter Processing
Facility (OPF) for each flow are now kitted
in advance. Spare parts are available for
on-time delivery a high percentage of the
time. Engineers are more readily available
to resolve unclear or incorrect work
authorization documents (WADs). The STS-
58 flow for Columbia was the best ever,
although a last-minute glitch on a range
safety computer forced a scrub. Areas of
concern remain the Improved Auxiliary
Power Units (IAPUs) that still require
frequent repairs, sometimes involving a Self-
Contained Atmospheric Protection Ensemble
(SCAPE) suit operation, and SSME
turbopumps that require inspection after
each flight.
The Task Team Leader (TIL) program has
been instrumental in reducing the frequency
of delays and incidents. The more positive
work environment brought about by task
teams has, in turn, contributed to more
reporting of close calls. However, the need
to make close call reporting even easier was
stressed by the Panel and acknowledged by
the SPC. Currently underway is a TI'L-
enhancement project to apply positive results
of the qTL program to all processing areas
and develop additional performance
measures.
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Ref. Finding #6
More than 1,200 positions have been
eliminated by the SPC since September 1991,
with only a small portion coming from
involuntary separations. A comparable
further reduction has been called for by the
end of FY 1995. The present reductions
have been achieved without an apparent
adverse effect on the safety of launch
processing. The operative question is
whether planned cost reductions, which will
inevitably reduce the number of processing
personnel, can be achieved without com-
promising safety and whether recognized
warning signs can indicate if safety margins
are on the verge of being compromised.
Based on information available to the Panel
from its activities at Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) during the year, it must be concluded
that additional reductions of the magnitude
already taken cannot likely be made without
a higher probability of impacting safety.
In addressing these questions, the SPC has
stipulated the following criteria: safety is
and will remain the number one priority;
capability for eight flights/year must be
maintained; all unique and critical facilities,
e.g., both launch pads, must remain open;
and continuing improvement must be
sustained. An ongoing program to enhance
employee/management communications and
greater reliance on structured teamwork
provides the foundation for the SPC's
continuous improvement process.
Of the personnel reductions during calendar
year 1993 up to the time of this writing,
incentivized/voluntary separations comprised
43 percent and normal attrition accounted
for 35 percent. Involuntary separations
amounted to 22 percent. Professional
outplacement services have been provided
to terminated employees as few, if any, of
the terminated workers will likely be rehired.
This also means there are few opportunities
to bring in new workers. As the median age
among existing workers continues to climb,
the difficulty of recruiting and training
younger employees who can develop the
required knowledge and experience to
sustain the program into the next century
is a cause for concern.
Developing metrics to provide an alert with
respect to the safety impacts of personnel
cutbacks is particularly difficult. A large
number of activities are routinely measured
and evaluated. Specific metrics to identify
cost-reduction danger levels in advance have
not been identified although NASA officials
believe that failing to achieve key milestones
will be one indicator of problems. At the
request of the Administrator, the Panel will
continue to work with KSC and the SPC on
the definition of appropriate warning
measures that can be used when making
decisions on future cutbacks.
Ref." Finding #7
Several Space Shuttle processing problems
at KSC have been attributed to issues related
to human factors. KSC has recently formed
a human factors task force to examine the
problem of human errors in Space Shuttle
processing and to develop remedies.
Unfortunately, this task force does not
include sufficient representation of trained
human factors professionals. Human factors
workshops for the task force members will
be held in an attempt to remedy this
deficiency.
To provide appropriate impetus to its
growing human factors efforts, NASA needs
to increase the number of trained human
factors professionals available to the
programs. Workshops to acquaint managers
and engineers with human factors principles
such as those being contemplated for the
KSC task force are an excellent way to
create an understanding of the benefits that
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this discipline can provide. They are not,
however, a substitute for specialists who have
training and experience in the field.
Ref: Finding #8
Quality assurance must be an inherent part
of any safe aerospace endeavor. One of the
traditional methods of quality assurance is
to use inspectors to verify the work of
technicians. In recent years, many complex
aerospace operations, such as airline
maintenance, have attempted to improve
their cost-effectiveness by limiting inspections
to only those that provide a true 'k,alue
added" to safety. If redundant or non-
productive inspections and signoffs are
eliminated, costs are reduced, and the major
responsibility for quality is placed on the
technician doing the work.
To decrease the overall process flow time,
increase first-time quality, and reduce cost,
KSC developed a Structured Surveillance
program. The program approach involves
reducing the reliance on hands-on
inspections for assuring quality. As a result
of the STS-51L accident and the additional
requirements imposed on the return to flight,
the number of inspections had been greatly
increased. It was the judgment of KSC
management that the Space Shuttle program
had progressed sufficiently since the accident
to warrant a cautions retreat from a position
that essentially required mandatory in-
spection of all operations and redundant
inspections of many. The essence of the
Structured Surveillance process is to identify
low criticality ("Crit 3") steps that need not
be inspected each time they are performed.
Included are tasks that do not impact flight
or mission safety and tasks that will be
verified later in the processing flow. For
these operations, mandatory inspections are
deleted, but some level of random inspection
is retained.
To assess the effects of reduced reliance on
inspections and to shed light on the
Structured Surveillance process, KSC
management undertook a Structured
Surveillance Pilot Program. The goal of this
program was to eliminate those inspections
that, in the best engineering judgment, were
not adding to the quality of the Space
Shuttle processing, and to assess the impact
on quality of those reductions. NASA and
each of its major contractors at KSC were
to implement a pilot Structured Surveillance
plan and assess its effectiveness before the
Center committed to a full-scale imple-
mentation of the concept. This was a
prudent course to follow.
The Structured Surveillance program has
now emerged from the pilot test stage.
Based on experience to date, it appears that
retaining the inspections inherent in the
Structured Surveillance approach can help
achieve at least the following objectives:
Providing more rapid feedback for
control and process improvement
than would be possible without some
inspections.
Providing a reasonable basis for
deploying quality assurance resources
so that they cover the entire
operation.
Developing estimates of first-time
quality in those Crit 3 tasks from
which inspections have been re-
moved.
Developing KSC-wide estimates of
performance that can be trended
over time.
• Determining award fee for the SPC.
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Each of these objectives is inherently
reasonable. Given the nature and frequency
of the Space Shuttle processing tasks,
however, it may not be possible statistically
to develop trend measures to replace the
results of 100-percent inspections. In order
to develop valid and reliable estimates, an
extremely rigorous statistical sampling plan
would have to be developed and scrupulously
followed. The operational reality at KSC,
however, will not likely permit this degree
of rigor. It is not certain that any facility-
wide trend measures could be reasonably
interpreted. Moreover, attempting the
rigorous sampling plan needed for such trend
measures may actually prove
counterproductive to the other objectives
of Structured Surveillance.
Overall, it can be concluded that the
Structured Surveillance concept is sound and
worthy of continuation and cautious
expansion.
Ref: Finding #9
Thermal damage was seen on the right and
left hand elevon files after STS-56 (OV-103).
The temperature indicators in these areas
all exceeded the limit of the device, which
is 290 ° F. The slumping of the tiles
indicated that approximately 1,000 ° F must
have been reached. This temperature is
sufficiently high so that the temper and
strength of the underlying aluminum may
have been affected. In light of the
observations from the STS-56 flight, an
analysis should be conducted to determine
the temperature profile seen by the
aluminum structure of the elevons and its
consequences on the strength of the
underlying structure.
STS-56 was a heavy-weight vehicle at a high-
inclination (57 ° ) orbit, resulting in increased
aero-heating during re-entry. At the time
of this writing, inspections of other tiles on
the wing were being made to determine if
they had been similarly affected. The values
assumed for pre-flight calculations of aero-
heating during re-entry of heavy-weight
orbiters from high-inclination orbits should
also be re-examined in light of the thermal
damage experienced by STS-56.
Ref: Finding #10
An effective, reliable thermal protection
system is essential to the success of the
Space Shuttle or any recoverable and
reusable spacecraft. Various approaches
and schemes involving both metal and
ceramic designs have been explored over
the years. One of the most successful
applications of ceramics has been the tiles
developed for the Space Shuttle. The
present ceramic refractory tile has been
employed on the Space Shuttle for over 10
years. While it has indeed proven to be an
effective heat protection device, it has
exhibited some operational deficiencies
relating to brittleness and shrinkage. Also,
it is heavier than desired.
Rockwell International, under contract to
NASA, is examining a tile using a refractory
block insulation called Alumina Enhanced
Thermal Barrier (AETB) that, when coated
with Toughened Uni-place Fibrous Insulation
(TUFI), has considerably improved
toughness, durability, and shrinkage-
distortion characteristics over the current
Shuttle tiles. This tile also promises a
significant saving in weight that could be
reflected in increased Shuttle payload, a
capacity much coveted for higher inclination
orbits. It is therefore reasonable for NASA
to support the development of thermal
protection tiles with improved mechanical
properties and lower density than the current
Shuttle tiles.
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Ref: Finding #11
The existing Orbiter cockpit displays are
based on 1970's technology. They provide
basic "raw" data to the crew using numerous
discrete electromechanical gauges and "green
screen" Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs)
displaying alphanumeric characters. Modem
display technology has evolved using both
color CRTs and flat panel liquid crystal
displays (LCDs). These displays have the
capability to integrate information that was
previously shown on separate instruments.
Through the use of color and graphical
formatting, they can show trends and
predictions to assist a pilot in "staying ahead"
of the aircraft.
The Space Shuttle program has embarked
upon an instrument upgrade program that
has been named the Multipurpose Electronic
Display System (MEDS). The plan is to
replace most of the discrete flight
instruments and the existing CRTs with a
set of flat panel color displays. The cost of
MEDS has been variously justified on the
basis of safety or as a remedy to the
obsolescence of the existing instruments.
In general, neither existing safety problems
nor obsolescence can fully justify the cost
of the retrofit, although MEDS should
obviate any current obsolescence issues.
MEDS also has the potential to improve
significantly the operational safety of the
Space Shuttle if enhanced capabilities are
included in the displays. These capabilities
include predictor information (trends), ascent
data, and proximity operations information
for on-orbit maneuvering.
Unfortunately, NASA has chosen to defer
any enhanced functionality for MEDS and
has not even embarked upon a coordinated
program to define the optimum formatting
for MEDS displays. Instead, the program
initially intended to emulate the existing
electro-mechanical instruments. That
approach has been abandoned in favor of
a consensus approach to iterating to an
interim set of display formats. If additional
funding is ultimately available, the interim
displays will be updated and/or enhanced.
Research and experience with "glass cockpits"
in aircraft have shown that flight crews
acquire information differently from discrete
electromechanical instruments and integrated
CRT or flat panel displays. Safety problems
may even be generated by attempting to
simulate the conventional instruments on
flat panel or CRT displays.
There are clearly some impediments to
optimizing the MEDS functionality. NASA
has limited training assets that must be
capable of supporting both the present
instruments and the MEDS suite while
conversion is underway. Adding functionality
would require changes in the primary flight
software that runs on the General Purpose
Computers (GPCs) in order to provide the
necessary inputs. Funding is limited.
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in
maximizing MEDS effectiveness, payback
of the system's development and installation
costs will not be realized until and unless
MEDS is allowed to reach its full potential.
The present approach to MEDS display
formatting delays some MEDS benefits and
may even derail them. NASA should
commit immediately to a thorough program
of research and development to define the
optimum MEDS utilization and plan for its
realization as quickly as possible. NASA
should include specialists from its research
centers and representatives of the flight crew
and avionics offices in this effort.
In summary, the engineering of the MEDS
looks good. The selection of experienced
display suppliers appears prudent. However,
NASA should reconsider the current plan
to use MEDS as an electronic substitute for
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the current flight displays, and consider a
plan to use MEDS with all the potential
advantages of improved operational displays.
Ref: Finding #12
Problems with the support of the Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU) and with the updated
version known as the Improved Auxiliary
Power Unit (IAPU) are among the most
serious impediments to satisfactory launch
processing and logistics support of the
Orbiter. The difficulties with the earlier
APU were limited life (21 months installed
or 18 hours turbine time), unsatisfactory
turbine life due to blade root cracks, and
Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) seat
cracking and leaking. The IAPU was
intended to provide a 75-hour life based on
upgrades, including a new turbine wheel
design, better life limits for the IAPU of 36
months installed, and a redesigned GGVM.
Nine IAPUs are currently installed in the
Orbiters (three per vehicle) and eleven are
in the repair cycle.
Problems with the IAPU include shaft
corrosion and continued GGVM difficulties,
particularly valve seat failures. Overall, the
IAPU appears to have failed to produce the
reliability and service life improvements
envisioned when it was authorized. As a
result, another review of the IAPU appears
to be required if this long-standing
unreliability problem is to be resolved.
Ref: Finding #13
The Space Shuttle's automatic landing
(Autoland) system has never been tested
to touchdown. The system follows the same
guidance commands that are displayed to
the pilots. Its design is intended to bring
the Orbiter safely to the touchdown point
but requires the crew to deploy the air data
probes, landing gear, and drag chute
manually and to control rollout guidance.
There are several situations that could arise
in which landing risk would be reduced by
the use of an automatic landing system.
These include:
Weather deterioration at the landing
site after the deorbit burn.
Loss of visual access through the
Orbiter's windshield due to a
hardware failure or smoke in the
cabin.
Subtle incapacitation in which the
crew's ability to pilot the Orbiter is
impaired but the crew and ground
controllers are unaware of the
impairment.
Obvious incapacitation in which the
crew is awake and alert but
recognizes that its ability to pilot the
vehicle is diminished.
Total crew incapacitation such as an
unconscious crew due to toxic fumes
or low oxygen levels.
The likelihood of each of these situations
has not been systematically examined. The
tacit assumption seems to have been made,
however, that the chance of total, obvious
or subtle incapacitation will increase as
mission duration is increased with the
availability of Extended Duration Orbiters
(EDOs).
NASA has now made the decision to
automate the deployment of the landing gear
and air data probes. The automated gear
and probe deployment essentially addresses
only the situation in which the crew is totally
incapacitated. In virtually all other situations
of subtle or obvious incapacitation, the crew
should be capable of throwing the switches
for deployment. The air data probe
deployment is not very time critical, and the
gear drop can be initiated early in difficult
situations.
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It appears that decisions regarding automatic
landings have been made based on minimal
analyses or tradeoff studies. Situations of
total crew incapacitation in which the crew
is still alive and recoverable tend to be
extremely rare. This is why no aircraft
automatic landing system includes gear
deployment (or arresting hook deployment
for carrier landings).
It would be worthwhile for NASA to reassess
the entire automatic landing issue before
committing funds to hardware or software
changes relevant to future automatic landing
versions. A working group including crew,
engineering, life sciences, and human factors
should be formed to estimate the likelihood
of each of the scenarios that could require
an automatic landing. This will help define
the need for enhancements to the existing
autoland system and/or its certification and
validation through flight test.
Also, NASA should consider upgrades to
the Microwave Scanning Beam Landing
System (MSBLS) receiver group to be of
the same redundancy level (fail
operational/fail safe) as the rest of the
system components used in current auto
approach/landing (pilot or autopilot) and
the possible installation and certification of
Global Positioning System (GPS) capability.
The use of GPS will improve safety of the
orbiter operation by allowing more flexibility
in selection of alternate landing sites.
Ref: Findings #14 through #18
The current or "Phase Ir' engine has
performed well in flight this year. The
number of in-flight anomalies has been
reduced to about 1.5 per flight, and most
of these involve instrumentation. Success
in flight has not been matched on the
ground, however. There have been a
number of aborted launch attempts and
launch delays attributed to the engine
system. These include a cutoff caused by
a contaminated check valve and another
resulting from the failure of a speed sensor.
Corrective action has been implemented for
these problems.
The launch delays were occasioned by
problems in the control of manufacturing
processes that resulted in events such as the
installation of an incorrect dash-number part,
mis-location of an etched marking on a
beating preload spring, and failure to install
a turbine blade damper centerplate. Very
thorough investigations, including a review
of manufacturing with an operations
standdown at Rocketdyne, have led to many
revisions in the manufacturing processes and
their control. The situation now appears
to be under control.
These events led to a series of re-inspections
of delivered hardware that required at least
partial disassembly of major engine com-
ponents, particularly turbomachines. This
caused a shortage of usable turbopumps
which, in addition to re-inspection of engine
nozzle welds, presents a hardware shortage
problem that it is estimated will persist until
mid-1994.
"Sheetmetal" cracks in the High Pressure
Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) have proven to
be more of a problem than anticipated.
Thorough review of the situation has resulted
in a tightening of the specification for
allowable crack size by a factor of four and
the reduction of allowable operating time
to 4,250 seconds. Of greatest concern is the
generation of fragments that can, if they
strike a turbine blade, cause blade failure
and lead to a catastrophic engine failure.
No such fragment generation has occurred
before approximately 5,000 seconds of
operation.
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Sensor failure, both temperature and
pressure, is all too frequent and is a
consequenceof theuseof fine wire required
in the design of thermistor temperature
sensors and strain gauge pressure
transducers. There is somework ongoing
to developmoreruggedthermocouple-based
temperaturesensorsystems.More rugged
pressuresensorsare alsoneeded. It would
be highly desirable to increasethe activity
level for suchdevelopments.
Several major component improvement
programs currently underway have been
groupedinto two blocksin order to provide
the most economical approach to their
certification and incorporation under
prevailing technical and budgetary
conditions. Block I comprisesthetwo duct
(PhaseII + ) powerheadwithout baffles,the
single tube heat exchanger, and the
Alternate High Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopump (HPOTP). This block is
scheduledto completecertification in 1995.
Block II, comprisingthe Alternate HPFTP
and the Large Throat Main Combustion
Chamber (LTMCC), is scheduled to be
certified in 1997. All components are
currently in development testingexceptfor
the HPFTP which has been deferred by
Congressionalmandate. It hadbeenhoped
that the work on the HPFTP could restart
during FY 1994,but asof the date of this
writing, no authorization has been
forthcoming. This jeopardizes the ability
to havethe Block II changescertifiedby the
planneddate. As aresult,thesafetybenefits
of theBlockII componentchangeswill likely
be delayed beyond 1997and may not be
available for the first Space Station
construction build.
The Block I changeshave completed 16
developmenttestsin enginesin full-upBlock
I configuration. There are no major
technical issuesfor the powerheador the
heatexchanger.The alternateHPOTP has
progressedwell in its developmentandhas
accumulatedover36,000secondsof testtime
of which over 5,000secondshave been at
full power (109%). The introduction of
silicon nitride balls in the pump end ball
bearing has eliminated this bearing's
problems.There isstill apropensityfor the
turbopumpto exhibit synchronousvibration
sensitivity,but it isbelievedthat tightening
clearance specifications in the bearing
mounts will go far towards rectifying the
situation. Cracking has occurred in the
turnaroundductcastingandtheturbine inlet
housing. Detail designchangeshavebeen
incorporated to reduce the number and
severity of the cracks generated. It is
believedthat the situation isunder control
with adequatefracture life achieved.
The development of the LTMCC for the
Block II engineisproceedingwell. Thirty-
four tests of the LTMCC have been
completed with no significant anomalies
encountered.Thebaselinedesigncomprises
the current Naraloy-Z liner with castinlet
andoutletmanifolds.Two otherapproaches
to the constructionof thechamberareunder
consideration. One is that of the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) Propulsion
Laboratorycomprisingaone-piecestructural
casting(manifolds andthroat section)with
a "platelet" fabricated liner. The other is
a Rocketdyneproposal employinga three-
piece castingand the standard liner insert.
Early in 1995,hot fire test results aswell
as demonstrated manufacturing schedule
andcostbenefitswill beusedto makea final
decision as to which of the three approaches
will be taken.
As noted above, the alternate HPFTP
development is still on hold but some 27
engine-level tests have been conducted on
the Technology Test Bed facility at MSFC.
An acceptable start/shutdown sequence has
been developed on the engine, and the pump
has been operated to 109% power level and
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to well below the allowable minimum net
positive suction pressure at the inlet. In view
of the sheetmetal cracking problem of the
Phase II I-IPFFP, restarting the development
is urgent.
The SSME controller monitors the status
of the engine during countdown and flight
by sensing engine conditions through signals
from a variety of temperature, pressure,
position, and propellant flow transducers.
It takes these inputs and, via a set of
algorithms in its software, determines the
"health" of the engine system. If it
determines that an anomalous condition
exists (e.g., violation of a "redline"), it will
inhibit engine ignition or shut down an
engine either on-pad or in flight in
accordance with the logic of its programmed
algorithms. Although some engine failure
modes (such as a turbine blade breaking off)
propagate too quickly for any remedial
action to be taken, many modes can be
sensed or predicted rapidly enough to
prevent a catastrophic engine failure.
The effectiveness of any such monitoring
system may be expressed in terms of the
extent to which it correctly classifies the state
or "health" of the system being monitored.
Both false alarms (a healthy engine being
classified as unhealthy) and false positives
(a failure being classified as healthy) are
to be avoided, of course. With most
monitoring systems, there is a tradeoff
between false alarms and false positive rates.
The more sensitive the monitoring system
is made in an attempt to correctly identify
real failures, the more prone it becomes to
false alarms.
The SSME controller system employs sensors
of old technology (which are prone to failure
as noted earlier), and its computer capacity
precludes the incorporation of more capable
algorithms and decision rules that are
possible with more state-of-the-art
technology. As a result, the probabilities
of shutting down a healthy engine or failure
to detect an engine anomaly are higher than
necessary. Updating the sensors, controller
hardware, and algorithms should provide
cost-effective risk reduction.
Ref: Finding #19
The aft skirt of the Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motor (RSRM) failed at a 1.28 factor of
safety (FOS) during a Static Test Article
(STA-3) full-scale static test. The addition
of an external bracket had been proposed
to modify the aft skirt for the now canceled
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) in
order to achieve the design FOS requirement
of 1.4. The installation of the external
bracket for the ASRM was to be fully
evaluated during the STA-4 static test. Since
cancellation of the ASRM and STA-4 test,
it has been proposed to use the external
bracket to reinforce the aft skirt of the
RSRM.
An 11-inch segment of an aft skirt will be
used in a specimen test to determine the
effectiveness of the external bracket
modification in reducing the overall bending
stress of the skirt. The first test was planned
for October 1993, but was delayed at the
time of this writing until January 1994
because of unforeseen slippage in the
fabrication of the test fixtures and test
articles. Implementation into the fleet will
be based on these test results and funding.
The first specimen test will provide insight
as to whether the input loads at the ends
and top of the test article are such that the
strains in the critical weld correspond to
those found during the STA-3 static test.
If the strains and boundary conditions cannot
be duplicated, other means of testing should
be evaluated. Alternatively, the existing
28
1.28-demonstratedFOS could be accepted
because the probability that 1.28 times
design limit load will be exceeded is
extremely remote.
polybutadiene (HTPB) propellant. These
changes have the potential to increase
reliability and/or performance if applied to
the RSRM.
Ref: Finding #20
A single crack was detected in a forward
case segment (S/N 55) after the STS-54
flight. The case segment had been flown
four times and had been proof tested
successfully during refurbishment. Other
cracks have been found in RSRM casings,
but this is the first time a crack had been
found in a forward segment.
It was determined that the crack occurred
during the manufacturing heat treatment
process because of an inclusion in the parent
material. The crack size was 0.27 inches
long by 0.10 inches deep. It was located 10
inches from the clevis end and oriented
longitudinally on the inner diameter of the
case. This is the only membrane crack found
in approximately 600 pieces of hardware that
have been manufactured. The crack was
less than half the critical flaw size.
The detectable magnetic particle threshold
is approximately 0.250 inches long by 0.125
inches deep. Hence, a 0.27-inch-long crack
in the inner wall of the case was in the
detectable range for normal refurbishment
inspections. Therefore, the inspection plan
for the case should be re-examined to verify
the minimum size crack that can be detected
by X-ray and magnetic particle inspection.
Ref: Finding #21
With cancellation of the ASRM, it is logical
to explore the inclusion in the RSRM of
applicable design features that were planned
for the ASRM. These candidate changes
include redesigned aft case stiffener rings,
case-to-nozzle joint redesign, the new nozzle
design, and the use of hydroxyl-terminated
Ref: Finding #22
Analysis of telemetered chamber pressure
data from the right-hand RSRM of the STS-
54 flight revealed a short duration
perturbation of 13 psi at 67 seconds into the
flight. The 13 psi is equivalent to a thrust
change of slightly more than 54,000 pounds.
A perturbation of this magnitude was higher
than had been recently observed. Therefore,
a thorough investigation was initiated. The
investigation covered reviews of the pressure
data from previous flights, the composition
of the propellant in the particular motor as
compared with earlier motors, manufacturing
history, solid propellant combustion pro-
cesses, flight dynamics, integrated vehicle
stability, and control factors as well as
structural margins throughout the Space
Shuttle system. Meetings of NASA and
industrial specialists in solid rocket motor
combustion phenomena were convened to
address the issue. Test programs to verify
some of the hypotheses of the origin of the
perturbation put forward during the reviews
were undertaken. The investigations and
reviews were very thorough, and some
aspects continue.
The review of the chamber pressure histories
of all Space Shuttle solid rocket motors
flown and tested on the ground (a total of
145 motors) indicated that perturbations or
"spikes" of approximately 1- to 2-second
duration have occurred in every one of them.
The "spikes" average between 5 and 7 psi
superimposed on a base pressure of about
670 psi. There were a number at about 10
psi, with a few, including STS-54, at about
13 psi. The spikes occurred on one or both
of the motors of a flight set with no
preferential side. However, during most
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flights there were perturbations on only a
single motor. Flight data also show that the
perturbations occur between 65 and 75
seconds into the burn. Statistical analyses
of these data indicated that the 3-sigma
excursion would be about 20 psi.
All manufacturing processes, propellant
chemistry, and control data indicate that the
right-hand STS-54 motor was within the
specification requirements. Vehicle dynam-
ics and control analyses indicated that the
thrust perturbations were well within the
control capability of the flight control system
even under greater than 3-sigma excursions
in pressure. Similarly, structural analyses
indicated that none of the established
structural margin (factor of safety)
requirements would be violated under such
pressure excursions.
A number of hypotheses as to the cause of
the perturbations were put forward. Among
the most plausible were: (1) the shedding
of parts of the castable inhibitor located
between the segments of the motors as the
bum progresses, resulting in partial blockage
of the grain bore or the nozzle throat as the
parts are expelled, and (2) accumulation and
expulsion of slag (aluminum oxide) gen-
erated during combustion, resulting in partial
blockage of the bore or nozzle throat. The
bounding excursion of pressure that could
be postulated was 31 psi, equivalent to
124,000 pounds of thrust (this is the value
used in the analyses noted above).
Static tests of motors on the ground showed
the presence of spikes such as those
experienced in flight. Real-time radiography
showed no evidence of breakup of the
castable inhibitor, but did show evidence
of a higher-density medium (slag) at the aft
end of the motor. An increase of
combustion chamber pressure "roughness"
after 50 seconds of burn was evidenced in
radiographic, calorimetric, strain gage, and
pressure gage data. Emission data from the
exit plume taken by radiometers correlate
with pressure data and also are indicative
of a more dense fluid (slag) being ejected
during a perturbation. In another test in
which the nozzle was vectored, pressure
perturbations corresponded to the two nozzle
vectoring events at 68 and 74 seconds,
respectively.
Analytical modeling of the inhibitor breakup
hypothesis yielded a requirement of inhibitor
fragments of some 12-14 square feet in area
to provide a pressure perturbation of the
magnitude observed. The generation of
fragments of this magnitude is difficult to
support. The hypothesis of slag expulsion
is supported by the following: (1) the
generation of slag has been confirmed
experimentally; (2) an annular "reservoir"
is generated around the submerged portion
of the SRM nozzle by completion of the
combustion of the propellant in that volume
at about 60 seconds into the burn, allowing
for the collection of slag in this volume; (3)
the burn rate of the grain shifts from
regressive to progressive in the 50-55-second
timeframe (this is conducive to the gen-
eration of roughness in the combustion
process); (4) the SSMEs are throttling up
in the 50-second timeframe, providing a
source of external acceleration; and (5) there
is a vehicle pitch maneuver at about 65
seconds (a standard event) that would result
in the "tilting" of the annular "saucer" and
expulsion of the liquid slag that had been
collected.
Although the slag expulsion hypothesis is
supported by the data obtained to date and
is a reasonable causal chain, additional
testing, data review, and analysis continue
as of this writing. The investigation of the
phenomenon has been, and continues to be,
thorough and objective. More important,
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all indications are that Space Shuttle safety
is not compromised even under the worst-
case perturbations that can be supported
by available data.
Ref. Finding #23
A Super Light Weight External Tank
(SLWT) has been proposed for the Space
Shuttle to provide additional payload
performance. Present estimates are that up
to 8,000 pounds of additional payload can
be gained. The SLWT replaces 2219
aluminum with 2195 and 2090 Aluminum-
Lithium (A1-Li) alloys. The A1-Li alloy has
improved fracture toughness, stress corrosion
resistance, stiffness, and strength. The
SLWT also includes a redesign of the liquid
hydrogen tank to employ an orthogrid
(square waffle) structure and tailoring of
the thermal protection system insulation on
the inter-tank to reduce weight. The use
of A1-Li accounts for approximately half of
the potential weight reduction because of
its increased strength and decreased density.
The structural and insulation changes
account for the balance.
The welding processes for the AI-Li alloys
are similar to those used for 2219 aluminum.
Even with the thinner skins, the decision
has been made to leave the weld lands at
the current thickness, which simplifies tooling
aspects of the change and results in a
stronger tank. With the marked increase
in fracture toughness, especially at cryogenic
temperatures, and the same weld lands, the
critical flaw sizes should be greater than for
the current lightweight tank.
To determine the effect of the increased
stiffness of the tank on the Space Shuttle
system, 12 ground and flight load conditions
have been analyzed. The preliminary result_
show the loads to be within the presently
defined envelope.
The entire program, including manufacturing
procedures, weight reduction estimates and
test plans, appears reasonable. With
cancellation of the ASRM, the increased
payload possible from the SLWT will be
valuable for the Space Station in its new,
high inclination orbit. However, the total
system impacts of the SLWT need to be
carefully examined.
Ref: Findings #24 through #27
The logistics and support programs for the
Orbiter and other principal project
elements--SSME, RSRM, and Extemal Tank
(ET)--all appear to be in satisfactory
condition. Some lingering effects of the
introduction of Orbiter OV- 105 (Endeavour)
have been overcome, and measurement of
the principal tracking parameters of
cannibalization, fill rates, zero balance, and
repair turnaround time show satisfactory-to-
excellent trends. In the parameter of
"pending loss of repair/spare," there is some
concern about certain subcontractors'
capability or willingness to continue mainte-
nance or overhaul support. About 80
contractors are being monitored in this
context, and alternative solutions are being
sought where necessary.
More specifically, cannibalization affecting
the Orbiter and the STS-54 through -57
launches has been minimal, reflecting very
favorably upon the efficiency of the controls
instituted over the past 3 or 4 years. There
are, however, some significant problems,
such as the unreliability of the IAPU. The
SSME is also having its share of problems
in particular with the availability of high
pressure oxygen and fuel turbopumps, engine
nozzles, and valves.
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Repair Turnaround Time (RTAT), which
has a major effect upon spares availability,
tends to fluctuate with the experiences of
launch demands for components and the
workload at the NASA Shuttle Logistics
Depot (NSLD). A major part of the RTAT
problem involves work at the Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs).
On the management and administrative
control front, the logistics and support system
within NASA and its contractors has been
excellent, and its control, trend reporting,
and audit systems appear to be functioning
well. Interrelationships, as evidenced by the
half-yearly Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP)
reports, show that the major contractors'
Integrated Logistics Systems (ILS) programs
comport well with those of the principal
NASA Centers--KSC, Johnson Space Center
(JSC), and MSFC. Inventory management
systems such as the Kennedy Inventory
Management System (KIMS) are being
constantly updated and performance
measuring methods such as the Maintenance
Trend Analysis Report (MTAR) provide
good visibility into the effectiveness of the
support.
Frequent audit examinations and analyses
are conducted, and the entire program is
well monitored. One especially commenda-
ble attitude on the part of the KSC ILS
management is the interest in recruiting and
training bright young people as analysts and
statisticians and the encouragement thus
afforded towards career paths in logistics.
The ILP is the most important coordinating
activity linking the project elements of the
Space Shuttle program. The ILP, which
serves as a forum for periodic review, meets
at a selected NASA Center every 6 months.
It is an invaluable source of knowledge about
the entire logistics program, and provides
cross-fertilization of ideas and standardi-
zation of techniques among NASA Centers
and their contractors. The ILP activity
should be continued without diminishment
or reduction in the frequency of its meetings.
It is the one central source of knowledge
of the interrelationship of the entire logistics
and support organization.
Cannibalization of built-up spare SSMEs
is now a significant problem. Seven HPFFPs
and seven HPOTPs were required to
complete the build of available spare engines
at the time of this writing. Engine nozzles
are also in short supply. It should be noted
that the manufacturers have already
instituted action to correct many of these
issues. It is essential to reinforce the
ongoing recovery program to ensure better
SSME component availability in the future.
The Vision 2000 program, which has been
subscribed to by key personnel at the
manned Space Flight Centers, outlines Space
Shuttle program organization and activities
to the end of the century and beyond. It
is, in effect, a "manifesto" for future
management approaches and procedures,
the underlying purpose being that of major
cost reductions brought about by organiza-
tional realignments and the elimination of
duplication.
While these reductions are obviously
necessary to meet the funding available, they
are going to be particularly harrowing for
the logistics community, principally because
of the increasing age of the Orbiter
structures, engines, and components and the
concomitant need for increased maintenance
attention. Component obsolescence is also
a major factor entailing more -- not less --
expenditure to meet the launch require-
ments. The present logistics system has been
arrived at over a period of more than 12
years, and, in spite of certain inevitable
,f_hortcomings, is working remarkably well.
It would therefore appear prudent to avoid
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any precipitous or arbitrary cutbacks that
might imperil the overall logistics system.
The NSLD continues to evolve as an
essential part of the Space Shuttle program.
It has added some advanced equipment and
has provided the skills, together with the
necessary training of personnel, for the
overhaul, checkout, and failure identification
of some 4,500 line items. Not only is the
NSLD a guarantee of continued support of
component overhaul when the OEM is
unable or unwilling to offer a satisfactory
program, but it is also highly cost effective,
in part because of its close proximity to the
launch site.
One of the activities in the logistics field
which has recently attained prominence is
that of Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing
and shelf stocking. This concept, which
involves deferring restocking certain items
until they are needed, offers many cost-
effective advantages and is now widely used
in the auto manufacturing and other
production-line related activities. With
careful control, JIT can be a valuable cost-
saving technique for NASA, although its use
should be confined to relatively easily
available hardware type items or readily
repairable components.
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Ref: Finding #28
The Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF)
is about to begin extensive testing of the
Perseus Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).
The Perseus is designed for high altitude
and long-duration observation missions. The
Perseus testing raises an issue of range
safety. The flight termination system is a
parachute that is deployed on command.
The vehicle is then lowered to the ground
by the parachute. The initial three flights
are limited to 3,000 feet above ground level.
The flight path is planned to be over Rogers
Dry Lake (Edwards), avoiding approach
patterns to the main runways. In addition,
these flight boundaries are reduced for the
case of wind drift for 30 knots from the
3,000-foot altitude. Control of the termi-
nation system would be by NASA, as it
should be. Test flights would be controlled
by the contractor and monitored by NASA.
This procedure is probably adequate for the
low-altitude flights, but a different approach
must be developed for the high-altitude
flights (probably above 10,000 feet) when
wind drift can be quite high. The area
around Dryden is no longer the totally
barren territory it has been in the past.
Dryden is depending on the contractor to
bring in a proposal for flight safety in this
part of the program which they would review
and approve.
At present, DFRF does not have a range
safety policy for UAV flights similar to other
unmanned test facilities. In earlier
unmanned vehicle testing activity at DFRF,
individual cases were evaluated and negoti-
ated. If unmanned flights are to be
continued at DFRF, the_ is a need for an
overall range safety policy that includes
definition of the areas, risk assessment, type
of flight termination, and range safety
displays and controls. In the case of Perseus,
NASA has some control over the project.
DFRF is concerned that there are other
projects where DFRF is simply providing
housekeeping with no control over the
project, including safety. This situation
cannot be tolerated without either NASA
or the Air Force having control of range
safety. This issue should be addressed as
part of the DFRF Range Safety Policy. The
Director of DFRF has recently established
a committee under the Chief Engineer to
develop a UAV range safety policy.
Ref: Findings #29 through #30
NASA's flight research facilities are among
the finest in the world. During the past year,
the Panel visited only DFRF which has
undertaken, with great success, some of the
most challenging and high-risk flight projects
ever initiated with a commendable safety
record. This has led to the designation of
DFRF as an independent center.
DFRF is currently engaged in a number of
interesting projects, one of which involves
post-stall flights. This is a unique flight
regime made possible by advances in aircraft
and engine technology and can only be
researched adequately in free flight.
Other programs of importance to the future
of the nation's commercial and military
aviation stature involve total integration of
power and flight controls, boundary layer
transition studies, and sonic boom studies.
In the interest of keeping the United States
competitive in the world aircraft market,
it is essential to maintain the flight research
capability at NASA's research centers. The
use of flight readiness reviews for programs
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andtechnicalbriefingsbeforeeachtestflight
at DFRF is an excellent way to minimize
test flight risk.
Much progress has been made in the various
DFRF flight research programs over the past
year. As part of the propulsion control
aircraft (F-15) program, a landing was made
on April 21, 1993, using only propulsion
control. This work is very important from
a safety standpoint and should be continued.
Aircraft of the future may be designed with
characteristics that enhance propulsion
control power. This will allow for possible
landings with structural damage, combat
damage, or a faulty aerodynamic control
system.
The performance-seeking, propulsion-
controlled testing is not directly related to
safety. It does, however, offer excellent
potential for efficiency gain in civil and
military aircraft operations. The multi-axis
thrust vectoring nozzle research should add
enormous impetus to both the propulsion-
controlled and performance-enhancing
research efforts.
The X-31 aircraft exhibited undesirable
stability characteristics at higher subsonic
speeds and was therefore limited well short
of the full maneuvering design envelope.
Also, an unexpected departure was
experienced during a high alpha test. This
departure could not be duplicated or
explained by analysis but is an excellent
example of the necessity of flight testing.
Another potential safety issue is an
insufficient quantity of hydrazine to run
emergency power unit (which furnishes flight
electrical power and therefore controls
power in the event of an engine failure) long
enough to return to the Edwards runway
from the test site. If the aircraft cannot
make the runway, the pilot must bail out.
This situation represents a risk that has been
deemed acceptable by the program.
DFRF should evaluate the specific program
objectives that can be uniquely performed
by the X-31 and cannot be performed by
the F-18 or F-15 vectored thrust aircraft.
The results of this study should be the basis
of continued testing of the X-31 and the
continued acceptance of risk. The F-18 High
Angle of Attack Research Vehicle (HARV),
another thrust vectoring program, has
completed over 82 flights with successful
maneuvers up to 70 ° angle of attack. The
software programming of the flight control
system has the potential to contribute
significantly to the design of advanced flight
control laws for future aircraft. The HARV
program provides a good example of risk
analysis and rational risk acceptance. The
possibility of spin chute interference with
thrust vectoring equipment is an example
of a risk that was properly assessed and
accepted.
The F-16XL supersonic laminar flow control
program is another example of the systematic
approach that Dryden follows to control the
inherent risks connected with experimental
flying. The Dryden Basic Operations Manual
clearly identifies a procedure to be followed
for identifying hazards and taking the
necessary actions to reduce them to an
acceptable level, up to and including a
redesign of the system.
The CV-990 Space Shuttle tire test program
is progressing well. Many taxi tests preceded
the initial flights, and six flights had been
accomplished at the time of the Panel's
review in August. A primary concern of the
Panel had been a braking problem during
a rejected takeoff and subsequent fire that
destroyed a previously-owned NASA 990
aircraft. A decision was made to carry no
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fuel in the center tanks -- ones likely to be
struck in the event of a test gear or CV-990
gear failure. Also, "armor plating" and
automatic failure detection hardware and
software have been incorporated in the
system.
Another of the unique programs ongoing
at DFRF is the SR-71 flight program, which
had completed 28 flights (both SR-71A and
SR-71B models) at the time of this writing.
There are a number of science payloads and
experiments that the aircraft are now testing
or have plans for testing. The aircraft has
unique capability for high-altitude (84,000
feet) and high-speed (Mach 3) flight and
should prove invaluable for testing sonic
boom theories and codes needed to design
an acceptable high-speed civil transport
aircraft. This use of the SR-71 aircraft
should be viewed as a flying laboratory and
funded as a unique national asset. Other
programs reviewed during the visit to Dryden
include the Small High Altitude Science
Aircraft (SHASA), the Perseus UAV, and
the Advanced Actuation/Fiber Optics
Systems.
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Ref: Finding #31
NASA programs have long had a significant
dependence on software processes. That
dependence is now increasing rapidly, and
will continue to do so for the foreseeable
future. With the increasing capabilities of
computer systems and their decreasing cost,
weight, space and power consumption, many
more functions are being controlled through
software, and the size and complexity of the
software is correspondingly greater. In
addition, and at least partially as a result
of the widespread increase in software
control of devices and functionality, com-
puter and software systems increasingly need
to be interoperable, not only within NASA,
but with other agencies and commercial and
academic organizations that will use or
create space system data. The multi-national
Space Station program, including the
Russians, may place particular demands on
interoperability because the Russian
computing capability and philosophy differ
from NASA's.
NASA's past approach to software
development has been to incorporate it
within the individual programs, allowing
them to determine their own requirements
and development, verification, and validation
procedures. In the future, this mode of
operation will be increasingly less satisfactory
as the complexity of NASA's computer
systems and the need for interoperability
grow. It is timely to examine closely the
overall structure and management of
software processes within NASA.
The need for a more comprehensive view
of software development processes has been
cited by several different organizations over
the past several years, including the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP),
the General Accounting Office, and most
recently, a subcommittee of the National
Research Council. These groups have called
for a variety of improvements to the software
development process, including software
hazard analyses, independent verification
and validation, more central oversight and
planning, and a variety of other potential
improvements.
Most of the recommended changes in
software policy to date have been made in
the name of safety within the scope of a
single program, e.g., Space Shuttle. The
emerging demands for interoperability and
the ability even to achieve the necessary
functionality dictate a broader safety need
that even more strongly argues for greater
centralization of software policy setting.
Interoperability will require coordination
among programs on such matters as data
definitions, representations, and access. This
cannot be done within the scope of in-
dependent program management structures,
but will require some central coordination.
NASA does not now have the overall
management policies, procedures, or
organizational structure in place to deal with
these broad issues. Although relevant work,
e.g., a software assurance plan and software
development guidelines, has been in work
for some time, progress has been slow and
still does not fully address all of the broad
Agencywide software issues. In view of
growing needs for interoperability along with
continuing needs for software safety
assurance, this is an important limitation.
Recently, however_ NASA has indicated a
consideration of an iiaternal effort to develop
the needed polices, guidelines, and
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structures, and has revitalized efforts at
creating software assurance and development
processes. This contemplated effort appears
appropriate and should be put in place with
the necessary resources as quickly as
possible.
Ref: Finding #32
NASA has consolidated Life and
Microgravity Sciences and Applications in
NASA Headquarters Code U. Its responsi-
bilities include human factors activities. A
Space Human Factors & Engineering Program
Plan is being prepared to guide future
research activities. There remains, however,
a clear need for more operational human
factors input in both the Space Shuttle and
Space Station programs.
NASA has needed a coordinated human
factors effort for some time. The existence
of a plan, however, is of little value unless
it is adequately funded and universally
accepted. At present, there are insufficient
resources allocated to human factors to
support either the long-term goals of the
plan or the essential short-term integration
of human factors within the operating space
flight programs.
NASA's human factors research efforts,
particularly at Langley and Ames, are
excellent. These efforts, however, particu-
larly related to space, are typically viewed
as basic research by the operating programs
and spaceflight centers. This assessment
is partially true and partially the result of
the "image" that human factors researchers
within NASA have conveyed. The space-
flight programs must adopt a specific goal
orientation with a decided "product" focus.
The research programs are seen as a search
for knowledge that sometimes leads to useful
spinoffs but cannot be relied upon to meet
deliverables and achieve budget or schedule
targets.
While there may be some validity to these
prevailing perceptions, there are also
compelling counterexamples. The problem
is that NASA human factors research and
development efforts continue to focus
primarily on long-term goals. What NASA
needs immediately is the integration of its
human factors expertise into the operating
space programs. Prime examples of efforts
that could benefit from human factors inputs
are the Multipurpose Electronic Display
System (MEDS) for the Orbiter and the
Space Station systems integration. In spite
of significant expenditures to retrofit flat
panel displays into the Orbiters, no funds
were allocated to designing optimum display
content or format. There is essentially no
human factors input to the MEDS program
in spite of the fact that the NASA research
centers have been studying aircraft display
formats for a long time.
The Space Human Factors & Engineering
Program Plan should be revised to include
a focus on the short-term integration of
NASA's human factors research assets into
the operating space programs so that the
plan is more responsive to NASA's needs.
This should be its most immediate objective.
In order to provide appropriate impetus to
its growing human factors efforts, NASA
needs to increase the number of trained
human factors professionals available to the
programs.
Ref: Finding #33
In the process of conducting other program-
or activity-focused reviews, the Panel has
encountered various applications of the Total
Quality Management (TOM) approach. The
Panel has also been asked by the NASA
Administrator for its impressions concerning
the application of TQM by NASA organi-
zations and contractors. What follows is a
summary of the observations and comments
by ASAP members to this request and is
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not intended as a comprehensive review of
NASA TQM activities.
Martin Marietta Michoud Assembly Facility.
Two years ago, the Panel was first briefed
on the TQM program being implemented
by Martin Marietta Michoud Assembly
Facility employees in constructing the
External Tank (ET) for the Space Shuttle
program. In May 1993, Panel representatives
returned for an update. On both occasions,
the Panel was extremely impressed with the
structure, philosophy, and spirit of the
Martin Marietta implementation effort.
The total effort has been renamed Mission
Success 2000. In May, the Panel representa-
tives were shown specific results of the work
of a Performance Refinement Team (PRT)
and a Application Process Team (APT)
dealing with the application of the thermal
protection system to the tank. Both teams
have achieved significant and measurable
advances as a result of their TQM efforts.
The high morale among hands-on employees
witnessed 2 years ago is still evident. It has
been buttressed with the pride and
recognition of accomplishment. This appears
to have strengthened the process by
reinforcing its benefits to the workforce.
Thiokol Corporation Solid Rocket Motor
Facility (Utah). As an integral element in
its RSRM program, Thiokol has committed
itself to a comprehensive TQM effort to
upgrade quality in manufacturing the motor
segments and associated equipment and to
ensure improved levels of industrial safety
in the manufacturing process.
Thiokol has set up 24 improvement centers
in the manufacturing process. Each center
establishes and controls its own 3-year
improvement plan. Each improvement
center competes for a share of a significant
monetary pool.
Results of the improvement process are
displayed on the work floor. The excellent
charts show a variety of quantitative
measures, e.g., reduction of scrap, repair,
rework, problem reports, and facility
cleanliness, that are specific to each work
center. A Safety Management System (SMS)
has also been organized to prevent and
control hazards at the point of manufac-
turing. Overall, quality has been improved,
unnecessary inspection points eliminated,
and Solid Rocket Booster stack time at KSC
has been decreased.
Rockwell Palmdale. Rockwell International
(RI) has made a concerted effort to
incorporate TQM principles into its
operations. The major goals are productivity
improvement in terms of cycle time and
quality, and human/organizational improve-
ment as reflected in commitment, assumption
of responsibility, and flexibility of the
workforce. It appears that the RI TQM
program could benefit fi'om the development
and dissemination of additional performance
measurements.
Shuttle Processing Contractor--Kennedy
_. The Lockheed Space
Operations Company as the Shuttle
Processing Contractor (SPC) has designed
a continuous improvement process built
around the functions of analysis, employee
involvement, improvement, measurement,
customer satisfaction, capabilities, and
processes. These functions are carried out
through a network of teams, beginning
with the top management steering team and
flowing through natural management teams,
task teams, process improvement teams, and
natural work teams. The SPC has invested
in extensive employee training in im-
plementing a task team concept. Various
devices--"skip-level meetings" (bypassing
immediate supervision), specialized news-
letters, and program/corporate status re-
ports--have focused on improving employee
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communications.To a muchgreaterdegree
thanpreviously,technicians,working in task
teams, process improvement teams, and
natural work teams, are actively engaged
in developingmoreefficient andsaferwork
procedures.Communicationsamongshop
floor technicians and engineering personnel
have improved significantly. A shop floor
data collection system is also beginning to
develop reliable measures of problem areas
and processing improvements.
Dryden Flight Research Facility. Without
specifically referring to "TQM" by name, the
basic principles of TQM are being effectively
employed at DFRF. The management at
Dryden has done an outstanding job of
instilling a high degree of teamwork into
the Facility's flight activities.
_. There is evidence of effective
application of TQM principles and practices
in various NASA activities. However, use
of the term itself is of little value unless it
is accompanied by top management's
determination to make its application and
implementation more than shallow, empty
phrases. In particular, management must
be committed to building a culture of trust
and personal responsibility among the
workforce. This requires leadership, training,
innovation, patience, honesty, a willingness
to change, a credible program of reward and
recognition, and the commitment to per-
formance measurement. This requires
knowledge and application of the tools that
bring about and validate meaningful per-
formance and product improvement.
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APPENDIX B
NASA RESPONSE TO MARCH 1993 ANNUAL REPORT
SUMMARY
NASA responded on August 23, 1993 to the "Findings and Recommendations" from the
March 1993 Annual Report. NASA's response to each report item was categorized by
the Panel as "open," "continuing," or "closed." Open items are those on which the Panel
differs with the NASA response in one or more respects. Continuing items involve
concerns that are an inherent part of NASA operations or have not progressed
sufficiently to permit a final determination by the Panel. These will remain a focus of
the Panel's activities during the next year. Items considered answered adequately are
deemed closed. Those items no longer applicable because of significant programmatic
changes are denoted "N/A."
Based on the Panel's review of the NASA response and the information gathered during
the 1993 period, the Panel considers that the following is the status of the
recommendations made in the 1993 Report:
RECOMMENDATION
NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS
1 Space Station Freedom (SSF) Program Safety and N/A
Mission Quality
2 SSF Assured Crew Return Vehicle N/A
3 SSF Orbital Replaceable Units CLOSED
4 SSF Integrated Station Executive software CONTINUING
5 SSF Data Management System N/A
6 SSF Timeliner software N/A
7 SSF Software Support Environment CLOSED
8 SSF Integrated Logistics System CLOSED
9 Orbiter automated landing system (AUTOLAND) CONTINUING
10 Shuttle Multipurpose Electronic Display System CONTINUING
11 Shuttle Improved Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPU) OPEN
spares
12 IAPU Gas Generator Valve Module CONTINUING
13 Orbiter pressure and strain gage measurements CONTINUING
B-1
RECOMMENDATION
NUMBER
14
SUBJECT
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) inspection and
test procedures
STATUS
CLOSED
15 SSME major component improvement programs OPEN
16 Flight Support Motors CLOSED
17 CLOSED
18
19
20
21
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor nozzle O-ring
sooting
22
Advance Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) aft skirt
factor of safety
ASRM stress corrosion cracking
ASRM manufacturing system software requirements
document
KSC Structured Surveillance Program
Use of task teams at KSC
Orbiter Processing Facility lighting23
28
N/A
N/A
N/A
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
24 NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot CLOSED
25 Space Shuttle logistics system CLOSED
26 NASA Headquarters Aircraft Management Office CLOSED
27 Review of aging aircraft CLOSED
CLOSED
29
30
Dryden Flight Research Facility risk reduction
measures
Office of Safety and Mission Quality organization
31
32
33
34
35
36
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
OPEN
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CLOSED
structure
Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER)
Virtual reality systems
Human factors issues
Software independent verification and validation
Integrated long-range infrastructure plan
Complete system testing
Total Quality Management CONTINUING
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RECOMMENDATION
SUBJECT STATUSNUMBER
37 Strategic Considerations for Support of Humans in
Space and Moon/Mars Exploration Mission (Life
Sciences Research and Technology Program,
Volume 1) report recommendations
CLOSED
B-3
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
Office of the Administrator
AUG 2 3 1993
Mr. Norman R. Parmet
chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
5907 Sunrise Drive
Fairway, KS 66205
Dear Mr. Parmet:
In accordance with your introductory letter to the
March 1993 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual
Report, enclosed are NASA's detailed responses to Section II,
,,Findings and Recommendations." The responses reflect the
status and intentions of NASA before Space Station redesign.
Changes in Space Station design and management structure
resulting from the work of the Redesign Team may dictate
future changes in detail, if not in spirit, of the. responses.
In the case of the Advance Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) program,
the current prospects for funding are uncertain. If the
program is terminated, the ASRM responses will no longer apply.
The dedication of the ASAP members to NASA continues to be
commendable. Your recommendations have helped reduce risk and
improve safety in NASA human/robotic programs and projects.
Your efforts are greatly appreciated.
We thank you and your fellow Panel members for your
valuable contributions and look forward to your next report.
As always, ASAP recommendations are highly regarded and receive
the full attention of our senior management personnel.
Si/]cerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
Enclosure
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1993 AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL REPORT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION FREEDOM PROGRAM
Finding #1: The Space Station Freedom program (SSFP) has progressed considerably in
the past year. The entire effort now exhibits a degree of stability and continuity that has
previously been absent. The program-level Safety and Mission Quality (S&MQ)
function, however, is still not being addressed effectively.
Recommendation #1: NASA should place special emphasis on better integration of the
S&MQ function into the overall Space Station program. Attention should be given to
assuring that the S&MQ function is an inherent part of the design and production
processes. Areas to be addressed with significant urgency include software verification
and validation, requirements for the caution and warning (C&W) system, and normal
and contingency operations planning.
NASA Response: The Space Station Redesign Team has defined a streamlined
management structure that should result in significant safety and mission assurance
(S&MA) cost savings during the program development and implementation phase. The
Space Station program will fund the technical program requirements (reliability and
safety engineering activities), while program oversight/assurance will be funded by the
Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), or lead or host Center
Directorate.
A formal Space Station Management Plan developed during the transition period will
ensure a clear understanding of the new management structure. This plan will serve as a
basic governing document that clearly defines all organizational roles and responsibilities.
The new S&MA structure will consist of two organizations: Assurance and Safety and
Reliability Engineering. The Assurance organization will provide independent program
assessment and will report directly to Headquarters OSMA. This organization,
collocated at the host or lead Center, will support the Station Program Manager. Its
primary responsibility will be an oversight function that encompasses establishment of
safety and reliability requirements in concert with the Headquarters OSMA policies and
guidelines, independent assessment and program risk analyses, quality assurance
processes, and hardware/software certification, including independent verification and
validation. The Safety and Reliability Engineering organization will be assigned to the
Space Station program as part of the Systems Engineering organizations. It will ensure
that the reliability and safety engineering function is inherent to the overall design
process.
The new management structure will continue the effective level of involvement that the
current program-level S&MA function (Level II Safety and Product Assurance (S&PA)
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Division) provides in the current SSFP. S&PA holds membership, participates, and votes
in all Space Station program software and Technical and Management Information
System (TMIS) Control Boards. The Division participates in the development of
program management and technical requirements for safety, reliability, maintainability
and quality assurance (SRM&QA), and initiates/supports applicable change requests
(CRs). S&PA reviews and recommends disposition for every CR evaluated by these
Boards. S&PA has contributed to Level III, International Partner, and Level IV Design
Reviews and the Man-Tended Capability (MTC) Phase Manager's Technical Integration
Group, the lead Level II Design Review team. S&PA's expanded quality assurance
integration efforts over the past year resulted in several program enhancements. S&PA
also conducted audits and special topic studies.
In addition to these overall program integration efforts, S&PA has been intimately
involved in reviewing requirements, plans, and designs for software verification and
validation, the C&W system, and normal and contingency operations planning.
_: The SSFP has established an Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV)
Project Office to develop requirements and manage the design of a "lifeboat" vehicle.
The panel examined the developed ACRV requirements in detail as part of a special
study (see Appendix D). The ACRV Project Office has established excellent functional
requirements which, if followed, should greatly reduce the risks inherent in leaving a
crew on the Space Station without an attached orbiter.
Recommendation//2: NASA should develop an ACRV as a lifeboat in accordance with
the ACRV project system requirements and philosophy.
NASA Rem_OnS¢: Concur. The Space Station program plans to continue development of
the ACRV. NASA is examining the acceptability of existing spacecraft from other
countries in order to minimize cost and to assure that the ACRV will be available for
use on Space Station Freedom in a timely manner. Provisions for the ACRV have been
included in the NASA 5-year budget for the redesigned Space Station.
Findin_ #3: To allow robotic replacement of Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs), the
ORU designs must be robot-compatible. While progress is being made, the optimum
level of robot compatibility has not yet been achieved.
Recommendation//3: NASA should set a goal of maximizing the number of robot-
compatible ORUs.
NASA Response: We concur that robotic compatibility is important to the design and
operation of the Space Station. The SSFP established a Robotics Working Group which
conducted an analysis to optimize the number of robot-compatible ORUs consistent with
practical application and need. The Robotics Working Group is an active organization
in which all work packages, operations, projects, international partners, and the Level II
program participate. It has developed two robotics standards: (1) SSP 30550, Volume
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I, "Space Station Robotics Systems Integration Standards: Robotic Accommodations
Requirements"; and (2) SSP 30550, Volume II, "Space Station Robotics Systems
Integration Standards: Robotics Interface Standards." The latter volume standardized
hardware and equipment for the accommodation of robotics systems. The Robotics
Working Group continues to work the addition of ORUs to the list of equipment
designated to be robotic-compatible in SSP 30000, Section 3, "Space Station System
Requirements," Table 3-55.
Only external, serviced ORUs are designated robot-compatible, because no internal
robots are planned. ORU parameters influencing the specific design requirements
include the physical geometry, mass properties, Mean Time Between Repairs, and Mean
Time To Repair. ORU numbers, implementation costs, and unit interface and
workstation environmental conditions are also considered in the design.
l_ndinz #4: Considerable progress has been made in automation capabilities for Space
Station Freedom. However, the inclusion of the C&W system operation within the
overall Integrated Station Executive (ISE) software is not scheduled until Mission Build
(MB) 17, and there are hints that this plan might be subject to future software reductions
and prioritization.
Recommendation #4: Because of the important safety role of the C&W system, NASA
should provide for its operation under the ISE software as early as possible.
NASA Response: The basic C&W is part of the Data Management System (DMS), not
the ISE. C&W capabilities will be present in the DMS starting at MB 2 in the form of
basic limit checking, and will be augmented by the ISE during subsequent assembly
stages. DMS requirements in Section 3 of the Program Definition Requirements
Document, Revision L, paragraph 3.2.5.1.1.25, specify that the DMS shall support a
C&W system that continually monitors the safety conditions and critical functions and
provides information to the flight and ground crews. ISE requirements in the paragraph
3.2.13.1.7 specify that the ISE shall augment the C&W capability accomplished by the
systems, elements, and payloads via the DMS by providing C&W synthesis. These
additional capabilities are stipulated in NASA-STD-3000, Volume IV, "Space Station
Freedom Man-Systems Integration Standards." The additional capabilities include
suppression of repetitive messages, annunciation of flood pattern recognition, and
initiation of synthesized annunciation of conditions not recognizable by an individual
system, element, or payload.
15"ndint_ #5: The central development facilities for the DMS may not be adequate to
support all of the software development and testing that will be required. Also, there is
concern over the adequacy of the access of payload developers to the software
development facilities.
Recommendation #5: NASA should review the capacity of its planned central
development facilities for the DMS software to assure that adequate facilities are
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available to handle the load expected for SSF software development. NASA should also
provide the payload community access to the DMS as quickly as possible and assure that
payload developers have the facilities and information they need to complete their work
safely and effectively.
NASA Rem_onse: NASA has reviewed the capacity of the central facilities in order to
verify their adequacy to support all required software development and testing. A recent
loading analysis update was presented at the Central Facilities Delta Preliminary Design
Review on April 26, 1993. The analysis shows a short period of need that exceeds
availability for a two-shift, 5-day week. This will be accommodated by scheduling and
additional shift work, as required. The Space Station program is continuing to study
ways that could enhance the productivity and availability including more verification
credit at the work packages.
The program intends to simplify payload interfaces with the core station such that
payloads will not require the use of the central facility. However, those payloads with
complex interfaces will have access. Change Request BB003472, "Add CSF/CAF
Requirements to SSP 30000," approved April 7, 1993, ensures that payload software
interfacing with core systems and software is accommodated. The DMS hardware and
software and support equipment are in the central f_acilities to support payload interface
verification; however, many potential payloads projects have emphasized that they
require flexibility in selecting specific verification facility support.
_: Neither the Timeliner tool being developed for scheduling Space Station
activities nor the scripts that will be developed using it appear to be receiving the same
level of verification and validation as other DMS software.
Recommendation #6: The Timeliner software and the scripts created using it should be
subjected to design verification and validation consistent with other mission-critical
software.
NASA Resvonse: Timeliner is being procured through IBM and will receive the same
level of validation and verification testing as other flight software. It has always been the
intent for Timeliner to be subject to the same level of testing as any other flight software
in accordance with SSP 30000, Section 12, "Space Station Program Master Verification
Requirements," paragraphs 4.1.15 through 4.1.18. These paragraphs require verification
of all flight software including in-line commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software.
l_ndin_ #7: The Software Support Environment (SSE) is of critical importance to the
SSFP. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Space Station software can be successfully
completed without the tools the SSE offers.
Recommendation #7, NASA should continue strong support of the development and use
of the SSE.
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NASA Response: Concur with the recommendation. The program will continue to
support and monitor the SSE development and utilization.
Finding #8: The SSFP has begun the planning and development of an Integrated
Logistics System (ILS), which coordinates the work packages and the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC).
Recommendation #8: Continue working on the plan for the ILS.
NASA Response: Concur. The Space Station program is continuing development of the
ILS at KSC. The program considers the ILS essential to the efficient and effective
management of operations and maintenance, spares, repairs, consumable requirements,
and resource allocations. It is also necessary for the planning and implementation of on-
orbit quality assurance planning currently in work.
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B. SPACE SHUTI'LE PROGRAM
_: The Space Shuttle Automatic Landing (Autoland) System needs only
minimal additional analysis and a few system design changes to extend its performance
limits and to support a complete definition of flight rules for its use. Cancellation of the
Development Test Objective (DTO) for an automatic landing on the flight of STS-53 has
further delayed the specification of these capabilities and the appropriate operational
role of the Autoland System.
Recommendation #9: Define the requirements and demonstrate the capability for an
Autoland System as soon as possible.
NASA Re__onse: The orbiter currently has a capability for automatic landings, to be
used as a contingency when the commander and the pilot are incapacitated or incapable
of landing the orbiter using nominal Control Stick Steering (CSS). Certification of
contingency Autoland has involved partial flight demonstration; on STS-2, -3, and -4
Autoland (automatic landing) was engaged from 10,000 ft. to as low as 125 ft. Further
certification testing of contingency Autoland has not been identified as a requirement.
Postflight data from each mission have been reviewed and indicate no instances of
unexpected divergence by the nonactive contingency Autoland from the reference
trajectory.
The requirements for demonstrating an automatic landing on the Shuttle have been
developed as part of a DTO. However, this DTO is not currently scheduled.
Reasonable mission rules, placards, microwave landing system calibration, and crew
training requirements have been identified. Software changes desirable to enhance
redundancy management of navigation sensors have been developed, though not yet
implemented. Options for automation of landing gear deployment, air data probe
deployment, braking, and nosewheel switching have been developed for incorporation in
a long-duration orbiter program.
We currently have no plan to demonstrate the Autoland System. This policy is the same
as not demonstrating a Return to Launch Site or Transatlantic Abort (RTLS or TAL).
The policy is not to take any additional risk for demonstration purposes without a firm
requirement.
As you know, the Office of Space Flight (OSF) is reviewing a crew exchange to preclude
pilots from landing on long-duration flights to Space Station which extend beyond the
crew's certified capability to land. Additionally, the OSF has developed an on-orbit
simulator for practicing landings prior to entry. This will enhance crew performance
during landing.
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In summary, the program is reviewing the operational flight rules pertaining to Autoland,
we have budgeted upgrades in software and hardware to improve the Autoland
functionality, the life sciences organization is collecting physiological data and developing
countermeasures to ensure adequate crew performance as the mission duration increases.
We are confident with using Autoland in a contingency mode, but do not plan to
demonstrate Autoland until a firm requirement mandates a demonstration.
_: NASA has funded the development and installation of a Multifunction
Electronic Display System (MEDS) for retrofit into the orbiter. This system will replace
the conventional electro-mechanical instruments with flat panel displays. Commercial
transports and military aircraft have been flying with MEDS-equivalent "Glass Cockpit"
systems for some years, some converted from older, conventional cockpit displays.
Recommendation #10: The inherent operational and potential safety benefits of MEDS
warrant its installation in the Space Shuttle as soon as possible.
NASA Response: The magnitude of the modifications to the orbiter vehicles to
incorporate the MEDS is quite large. This is known to involve removal and installation
of flight deck panels, installation of avionic Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) cooling ducts,
and installation of new LRU wiring and the LRUs themselves. The nature of these
modifications coupled with the subsystem development schedule, testing schedule, and
delivery dates of MEDS hardware, warrant installation of the MEDS during orbiter
maintenance/interval inspection down periods. First flight is scheduled in the fourth
quarter of FY 1996.
_: The inventory of Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) is currently being
upgraded to an Improved Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPUs) configuration to improve
reliability and service life. The upgrade program, however, projects a condition of zero
spares in the future due to time limits on some parts.
Recommendation #11: NASA should take the steps necessary to preclude a situation of
zero IAPU spares.
NASA Response: The entire orbiter fleet will be upgraded to fly only IAPUs with the
completion of the OV-104 Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP) 1. The spares
posture is improving, but cannibalization will continue to be a possibility until all older
APUs are upgraded to IAPUs and are available for installation in the field.
_: The IAPU represents a major improvement in durability and safety.
However, the Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM or "Bang-Bang" Valve) continues
to require frequent replacement because of the high-stress manner in which the valve
operates. There are alternative valve designs that can be adapted to perform the same
function.
Recommendation #12: NASA should continue to explore improved GGVM designs with
the goal of providing a replacement for the current configuration as soon as practicable.
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NASA Response: Development of an alternative GGVM design and vendor to provide a
replacement for the current design has been implemented. First flight is scheduled for
the fourth quarter of FY 1996.
E/_I_K.U_: The results of flight tests on the orbiter Columbia (OV-102) using pressure
and strain gauge measurements on the wing showed that the calculated ascent loads on
the wing are conservative. Additional flight tests to be conducted will measure the
pressure distribution and strains on the wing and tail of OV-102. These data are
required to substantiate that the predicted applied and internal loads on the wing and
tail are conservative.
Recommendation #13: Conduct the planned tests as expeditiously as possible. Particular
emphasis should be placed on the loads on the tail.
NASA Response.: The Space Shuttle program has conducted a series of structural DTOs
flights to collect the pressure and strain gage data on wing loads. Additional DTOs are
planned for STS-55 and STS-58. The collected flight data will be used to verify the
orbiter aerodynamic data base which has been used in loads analyses. Vehicle loads
analyses are expected to be completed by October 1994.
_: The SSME program is doing well and has sufficient spares. However, the
engines still require meticulous attention to detail in inspections and tests.
Recommendation #14: Continue the vigilant implementation of the inspection and test
procedures while design solutions for known weaknesses are being addressed.
NASA Response: The SSME program will continue vigilant implementation of improved
inspection techniques and acceptance test procedures. Design solutions, recurrence
controls, limitations, and product improvements are addressed routinely to assure and
increase operating margins and safety margins.
_: The individual major component improvement programs are making
progress. However, a total engine upgrade is being delayed because the High Pressure
Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) part of the Alternate Turbopump program (ATP) is on hold.
The highly effective Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber (LTMCC) has finally
been made a formal part of the SSME program by NASA but has been denied
appropriations by Congress. Schedule disparities among the various component
improvements lead to interim certifications of components in engine configurations that
will never fly and to unnecessary duplication of certification tests.
Recommendation #15: The identified SSME design improvements are vital to the
reduction of Space Shuttle operational risk. Therefore, NASA should reinstate the ATP
HPFTP development as well as continue to press for approval of the LTMCC, and
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examine carefully the benefits of integrating all the individual modifications into a block
changeprogram.
NASA Response: NASA fully agrees with the reduction of the operational risk by
introducing the ATP pumps and the LTMCC into the SSME, and the Agency will
continue to press for the go-ahead approval of the LTMCC and the ATP HPFTP.
Development and certification of two block changes will incorporate the safety features
quickly and efficiently. Block I will include the ATP high pressure oxygen turbopump,
the Phase II + two-duct powerhead, and the single-coil heat exchanger. Block II will
include the ATP HPFTP and the LTMCC. Funding for the ATP HPFTP and the
LTMCC have been submitted in the President's FY 1994 budget. Following budget
approval by Congress, these safety improvements will be aggressively pursued to
accelerate implementation of the Block II changes.
_nding #16- Three Flight Support Motors (FSMs) have been used to date to verify
quality and qualify design improvements, reproducibility, and replacement materials for
the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). In the near future, new materials will be
needed in the RSRM to replace those eliminated for environmental or safety concerns.
It will also be necessary to qualify new vendors to replace those who have left the
industry or are no longer willing to supply components for the RSRM.
Recommendation #16: To maintain safety and performance, NASA should continue the
use of FSMs for quality control, validation of design improvements, and qualification and
verification of new materials, processes, facilities, and equipment.
NASA Response: It is NASA's intention to continue to qualify new materials or process
changes incorporated into the RSRM via the FSM program. The next FSM is FSM-4,
scheduled for November 1993. The timing of these changes and the subsequent
qualification efforts are subject to budgetary constraints.
I_nding #17: Soot has been found on the O-rings serving the RSRM nozzle internal
joint number two significantly more frequently than on the similar O-rings for the other
four joints combined. A new assembly sequence with Room Temperature Vulcanizer
(RTV) backfill is being used to counter this problem.
Recommendation #17: The possibility of heat effect or blowby at the primary seal of
nozzle joint number two is sufficiently high to suggest the need for a redesign of this
joint to eliminate the present procedurally based solution.
NASA Response: The action which the Shuttle program is implementing to correct the
deficiency of joint number two involves changing the assembly process. We believe, and
the OSMA concurs, that the corrective action being taken is proper, recognizing the
relatively minor consequences of the deficiency and the high cost and development risk
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which a redesign in this area might entail. Inspection of the first flight motor with the
new process look favorable with blowhole occurrence reduced. We will continue to
review this improvement.
During the redesign program following the Challenger accident, this joint was
redesigned. The primary O-ring was added to make the seal redundant and also allow a
leak check to be performed during nozzle assembly. There is a RTV sealant applied
between the nose cap and cowl which is to prevent circulation of hot gas combustion
gases in the joint. The joint is deficient because blow paths often occur in the RTV,
allowing hot-gas penetration to the primary O-ring seal, the cowl-to-cowl housing bond,
and to the joint metal parts. The sealing integrity of the primary O-ring has never been
a concern to the Shuttle program, even with the many occurrences of gas paths to the
seal, because the O-ring is a face seal fully enclosed within the O-ring groove and
covered by the flex bearing flange, and because the joint is static and does not open with
motor pressurization. There has never been erosion or heat effects observed on the O-
ring or its sealing surfaces.
The finding of blow paths in the cowl-to-cowl housing bondline on STS-37 did, however,
raise a concern for potential failure of that bond. The resulting analysis concluded that
in the event of a failure of this bond, the leak path would be into the flex bearing/flex
boot cavity which is not catastrophic. There is also a redundant mechanical attachment
of the cowl to the cowl housing (36 steel shear pins) which would retain the cowl in the
event of complete bond failure. This has been the basis for the flight rationale since
STS-37.
In the current assembly procedure, an epoxy adhesive is applied to the cowl housing and
RTV is applied to the nose cap at the same time. There is some mixing of the adhesives
which prevents uniform curing, and air is sometimes trapped within the bondlines,
leading to the formation of blow paths. The corrective action changes this procedure to
separately bonding the cowl and cowl housing, installing the joint bolts, and then
backfilling the RTV into the cowl/nose cap gap. This change is a low-risk improvement
which has been thoroughly tested and is expected to significantly reduce the occurrence
of hot-gas intrusion into the joint. The first flight of this change will be STS-57.
Finding #18: The projected factor of safety of the aft skirt when used on the Advanced
Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) is less than specified. Installation of an external bracket
has been proposed as a means of returning the factor of safety to the level in the design
requirements. A segment of an aft skirt is to be used to test the effectiveness of the
external bracket modification. The test of this 11-inch-wide specimen may not duplicate
the actual strains and boundary conditions that would be experienced by a complete aft
skirt and, therefore, may yield unreliable results.
Recommendation #18: The effects of the external bracket modification would be better
evaluated if a full-scale skirt were tested in the facility that was previously used for the
influence testing of a complete aft skirt.
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NASA Response: Several testing options were evaluated for the external bracket concept.
The first option was an influence test in which an aft skirt is loaded without and with the
external bracket. This test would not destroy an aft skirt. The influence test option was
eliminated because of the nonlinear behavior exhibited in weld region (the skirt will have
to be loaded to high levels to obtain useful information). The next option considered
was a full-scale aft skirt failure test. This type of test is limited in several ways. Only
one holddown post can be taken to failure and provide useful test information. The
magnitude of the test would result in a significant schedule impact. The complexity of
an elaborate test setup would require a large engineering effort. The cost would
approach that of a full Structural Test Article (STA) test.
The component test method was proposed to avoid the problems of the full-scale aft
skirt test. The component concept allows the testing of up to four test articles to failure.
Direct comparison between the external bracket concept and the baseline configuration
under identical test conditions can be made. The component test concept requires a
smaller and less complex test fixture than for a full-skirt test. The cost and schedule
impact are much less than for a full-skirt test.
The validity of the component test concept depends on the ability to develop a load set
that provides a proper state of stress in the area of the external bracket (critical weld
region). Finite element analysis has determined that the external bracket does not effect
the overall stiffness of the aft skirt. The regions affected by the bracket are included in
the test article. Detailed finite element models were used to develop a set of test loads
which will produce the STA-3 state of stress in and around the critical weld region.
Furthermore, the STA-3 distribution has shown agreement with strain data from flight
vehicles. The component test method is the preferred method of testing both from a
technical and an economic point of view.
_'n.._- Potential stress-corrosion cracking of case welds on the ASRM is an
acknowledged problem. The residual stress is not uniform over the entire weld.
Residual stress peaks can occur at the start and stop of the welding process.
Recommendation lllg: The ASRM program should assess the adequacy of its stress-
corrosion cracking test plan to assure that sufficient pass/fail criteria tests are included.
NASA Response: ASRM takes issue with this finding/recommendation. The project has
conducted an extensive test program utilizing resources at Babcock and Wilcox, the
University of Missouri, and the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Materials and
Processes Laboratory with the goal of quantifying residual stresses as well as evaluating
susceptibility to stress-corrosion cracking. This program is virtually complete and the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) concerns are being shown to be nonproblems.
_: The top-level requirements document for the ASRM manufacturing
software is not scheduled to be available until July 1993. Also, systems integration and
systems-level testing plans for the ASRM manufacturing facility are not yet ready.
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Recommendation #20: The overall ASRM manufacturing system software requirements
document and systems integration and test plans are important parts of the system
development. They should include a comprehensive test plan and an evaluation
mechanism capable of tracking the system operation through its lifetime.
NASA Rcm_ons¢: ASRM currently has activities underway which address each of the
ASAP concerns in these areas.
Overall ASRM manufacturing systems and integration requirements are being detailed in
the Automated Manufacturing Systems (AMS) specification document which is currently
under development and will be completed in July 1993. This document will define the
total manufacturing computer system hardware and software requirements for ASRM.
An integrated test plan for the AMS software is also being developed and will be
completed in the same timeframe. A manufacturing test bed is being built which will be
utilized to verify AMS software requirements in accordance with the integrated test plan.
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ....:.: +:.:.: +: + :.:.: +:-:.:.:+ :': + :':':'.'.'-':':':':'-'.'.'.'.''"
El./tdLt_,.._d: The KSC has begun a pilot Structured Surveillance program with the
objective of increasing the efficiency of the quality control function in order to enhance
launch turnaround processing. This program appears to have great potential.
Recommendation #21: Before Structured Surveillance can be fully implemented, it must
be carefully evaluated to assure that it is fully supportive of safe flight operations.
NASA Response: The Structured Surveillance program is in the early stages of
development with emphasis on maintaining safe flight operations. Operations and
Maintenance Requirements Specifications (OMRSs) derived from Critical Items Lists
(CILs) or Hazard Report acceptance rationale will continue to have the previous level of
quality assurance inspections. Acceptance and installation of Criticality 1 hardware will
also continue to have both contractor and NASA inspections. Evaluation of the results
of the pilot program indicates increased efficiency of the processing effort and continued
effectiveness of the quality assurance activities. We are moving slowly into this program
with close management attention to assure safe flight operations.
/_: The use of task teams at KSC has expanded with apparently successful
results.
Recommendation #22: Continue to develop and use the task team concept. If structured
surveillance proves successful, consideration should be given to integrating it with the
task teams.
NASA Response: The task teams will continue to be developed and used because of the
positive results from this concept. The Structured Surveillance program is in the early
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stages of development and as it matures, consideration will be give to integrating it with
the task teams.
/_: A new high bay Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF-3) has been opened at
the KSC. In addition to advanced support equipment, OPF-3 has vastly improved
lighting, which should decrease accident risk and increase productivity.
Recommendation #23: NASA should upgrade the lighting in the other orbiter processing
facilities as soon as possible to avoid differences across the high bays and maximize
safety and productivity.
NASA Response: KSC acknowledges the findings and agrees with the recommendation.
Actions are in process to improve the lighting disparities. Because the most significant
differences are in platform configurations and light-reflective surfaces, all surfaces that
can reflect light on High Bay 1 and 2 platforms are being painted white. The floors in
High Bay 1 are also being painted white and those in High Bay 2 are scheduled to be
painted white in August 1993.
Finding #24: The NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) has great potential for
improving repair turnaround times and enhancing the logistics program. At present,
however, repair turnaround times are still significantly longer than desired due largely to
protracted failure analysis times.
Recommendation #24: The Space Shuttle program needs to establish a more effective
method of moving units through the repair cycle in order to achieve the full potential of
the NSLD.
NASA Response: The protracted failure analysis times, especially those involving original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), are the most prominent contributors to the long
repair turnaround times. Such turnaround times involving OEMs have averaged about
four times those at the NSLD. The failure analysis capability at the NSLD has been
enhanced during the past year. Initiatives are also underway with the Johnson Space
Center (JSC) Orbiter and GFE project to improve the overall failure analysis process
relative to identification of requirements as well as location where the analysis is
performed. The increasing utilization of the KSC NSLD capability for both failure
analysis and repair will significantly improve the average repair turnaround time and the
overall logistics program in general.
Finding #25: Performance of the Space Shuttle logistics system is excellent and
difficulties such as loss of suppliers are being diligently addressed and corrected.
Recommendation #25: Continue placing the strongest possible emphasis upon controlling
the growth in the number of below-minimum or zero-stock levels. Where possible,
alternative sources should be qualified or manufacturing and repair capabilities should
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be transferred to NASA facilities such as the NSLD to compensate for the loss of
suppliers.
NASA Rc,__ons¢: Emphasis has been placed on initiating additional transition of repairs
to the NSLD and other Government facilities (i.e., White Sands) to compensate for
supplier loss, high costs, and instability. A total of 19 certifications are planned this year
and 20 vendors are being reviewed for future transition. Particular issues such as zero or
below minimum stock levels are emphasized at the project level and reviewed routinely
by the program for adverse trends.
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C. AERONAUTICS
_[_tit/._g,..._._: A NASA Headquarters Aircraft Management Office (AMO) has been
established. The office is headed by a senior manager reporting directly to an Associate
Administrator. In addition, a new, comprehensive NASA Aviation Safety Officers
Reference Guide has been promulgated.
Recommendation #26: NASA should continue to support a strong Aircraft Management
Office and manage the NASA Aviation Safety program in accordance with the NASA
Aviation Safety Officers Reference Guide. The longstanding and dedicated Intercenter
Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP) should be maintained as an independent entity.
Together, the AMO and IAOP, guided by this reference guide, should be highly effective
in maintaining the safety of NASA's aviation activities.
NASA Response: NASA agrees that a strong AMO and an independent IAOP will
contribute to the safe and efficient operation of NASA aircraft and that the Aviation
Safety program should be managed in accordance with the NASA Aviation Safety Officers
Reference Guide. The guide was developed by the Headquarters OSMA to improve the
NASA Aviation Safety program which is conducted according to the provisions of NASA
Management Instruction (NMI) 7900.2A, "NASA Aircraft Operations Management";
NHB 7900.3 (V1), "Aircraft Operations Management Manual"; Chapter 7 of NHB
1700.1(V1-B), "NASA Safety Policy and Requirements Document (formerly the Basic
Safety Manual)"; and other applicable NASA directives.
_: NASA maintains a fleet of aircraft for management and administrative
purposes. Many of these aircraft are old, and some have even exceeded their originally
specified service lives. Although excellent maintenance is currently coping with problems
such as stress corrosion due to age, safety can be compromised if the level of
maintenance decreases.
.Recommendation #27: NASA should conduct a review of its aging aircraft and establish
a coordinated program of upgrades, replacements, and appropriate additional safety
inspections.
NASA Response: Concur, the AMO is leading an Agencywide, multifaceted effort
examining aging aircraft. The AMO is aggressively pursuing opportunities for obtaining
newer, more efficient aircraft that become available as a result of the military drawdown.
The AMO, in conjunction with the IAOP is developing a rigorous enhanced Gulfstream I
Structural Corrosion Control Inspection to validate the integrity of these 30-year-old
aircraft. This inspection program will be adapted to other older aircraft in the NASA
fleet. NASA will continue to maintain all its aircraft to the highest standards to ensure
safe, efficient, productive mission accomplishment.
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/_l_J._,_/f_: Flight Research at the Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF) includes a
number of test programs with aircraft, such as the F-15 and SR-71, that are potentially
hazardous and therefore require a continuous and detailed safety effort. The Dryden
safety procedures and activities continue to control the risks associated with these flight
tests.
Recommendation tf28: DFRF should maintain emphasis on the practice of periodic
reviews of safety procedures to ensure that all reasonable risk reduction measures are
being taken.
NASA Rest,ons¢: DFRF procedures for flight program development, flight readiness
reviews, and flight test operations have been long established and well proven. Safety
assurance and risk management reviews are, and will continue to be conducted
periodically by DFRF, Ames Research Center, the IAOP, and NASA Headquarters.
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D. OTHER
_: At the request of the NASA Administrator, the panel examined the
organizational structure of the Office of Safety and Mission Quality and the counterpart
organizations at NASA Centers. The study concluded that the current organizational
arrangement provides an appropriate and effective relationship between NASA
Headquarters and the Centers.
Recommendation #29: Maintain the current organizational structure, but clarify the
functions and duties of the Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Quality and those
of Center Directors and, if necessary, issue revised NMIs.
NASA Response: The role and responsibilities of the Headquarters Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (Code Q) have been realigned as the result of the recent internal NASA
Headquarters red team/blue team reviews. Based on the teams' findings, the name of
Code Q has been changed to the "Office of Safety and Mission Assurance" to more
accurately reflect its function. Other changes have been instituted to streamline the
overall activity and realign resources to better support the evolving needs of NASA
programs and missions. A NMI incorporating these changes was signed on April 9, 1993.
Although the mandate of the OSMA will continue to emphasize its role as the Agency's
"safety conscience," the changes ensure an appropriate and harmonious balance between
Code Q's independent program oversight and support functions. The Office will provide
an upfront contribution to programs (prevent problems by building in safety, reliability,
and quality assurance at the earliest possible stage), focus efforts to manage the quality
process for NASA payloads, and increase system engineering/concurrent engineering
capabilities, while expanding risk-management capabilities to support program managers
in meeting schedule and budget constraints during critical decisionmaking processes.
The strategic thrust of the Office over the next 2 years will be to: (1) Integrate
SRM&QA requirements at the appropriate stage of a program; (2) Advocate SRM&QA
oversight and assessment functions across the Agency; (3) Develop and promote NASA-
wide risk-management practices; (4) Maintain a strong contributing SRM&QA presence
in NASA programs and operations; and (5) Develop and advance engineering standards
and practices.
l_'nding N30: NASA has begun development of a Simplified Aid for Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) Rescue (SAFER). SAFER is a small maneuvering unit intended to fit at
the bottom of the Portable Life Support System (PLSS) of an EVA astronaut. Its main
purpose would be to permit the safe recovery of an astronaut who becomes untethered
from the Space Station or an orbiter that was operating in a mode which prevented it
from moving quickly for a recovery. SAFER would also provide significant
maneuverability for EVA astronauts, without the need to carry and deploy the larger and
more complex Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU). The SAFER concept has merit for
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enhancingsafety and improving operational efficiency. The developmentprogram
appearsto haveproceededsatisfactorily.
R¢c, ommendation #30: Because the requirement for a SAFER as a rescue unit appears
to be well founded, and it has additional mission benefits, its full-scale development is
recommended as soon as possible.
NASA Re_onse: SAFER design, study, and pre-production activity is continuing.
A Project Management Plan for Phase I of the Flight Test project (FTP) has been
written. Requirements validation for the SAFER has been established, and development
testing of a prototype SAFER unit has been successfully conducted. A Flight Test
Article (FTA) is being built at this time. Once built, the FTA will be flown on a Shuttle
mission. This flight will be used to validate SAFER operating characteristics and ensure
adequate engineering performance in a space environment. This type of activity is
essential in confirming the accuracy of ground-based simulations. Results of this FTP
will be used to refine the SAFER design prior to production. Manifest options for the
FTA are currently being considered in the 1994 timeframe. Phase II of the project, the
SAFER flight production project, will be initiated after completion of this activity.
/_7_fdlg..__/.: The Intelsat repair mission highlighted the need for additional types of
crew training aids that can augment existing computerized and underwater simulators to
provide better representation of the dynamics involved in EVA work efforts. The virtual
reality systems being developed by NASA and others appear to offer significant promise
for providing some of the additional training needs.
Recommendat_n #31: NASA should begin a program to assess the benefits of using
virtual reality systems in more aspects of astronaut training.
NASA Response: Virtual reality technology is currently being investigated for
applicability to training by several Centers: JSC is developing a virtual reality training
simulator to help prepare astronauts for Hubble-related maintenance; Ames Research
Center is working with dynamic response of virtual environment spatial sensors, 3-D
auditory displays for aeronautical applications, and extravehicular activity self rescue in
virtual environments; Jet Propulsion Laboratory has developed interfaces with telerobotic
control using virtual reality environments; MSFC is studying virtual reality applications to
microgravity mobility and ergonomics; and Goddard Space Flight Center is investigating
the use of virtual reality technology for telerobotics. All of these activities apply to the
simulation and training of astronauts for Shuttle EVA and Space Station maintenance
activities. A NASA technical report on virtual reality technology is expected to be
published during the summer of 1993. This report will describe all Center research
efforts and proposed applications of virtual environments. This report represents a
major step toward the goal of providing a more realistic environment for astronaut
training.
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/_g..qd.t_,d_._: In spite of some progress, the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom
programs are still not sufficiently addressing human factors issues. For example, the
absence of a definitive user console layout standard between NASA and the international
partners for the Space Station could cause problems for training and on-orbit operations.
Recommendation #32: NASA management should encourage the active consideration of
human factors issues within the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom programs.
This might be best accomplished by requiring the inclusion of someone with specific
human factors training in decisionmaking at all levels.
NASA Rem onse: The panel's advocation of increased human factors involvement in
NASA programs has not gone unheeded. NASA concurs that increased involvement of
human factors professionals in the decisionmaking process is required. Human factors
professionals from the crew systems organization at the JSC are deeply involved in the
MEDS development project. Active involvement of human factors professionals in other
recently initiated Space Shuttle improvement projects will also bear witness to our
increased commitment to improved human factors. Additionally, the JSC Director
recently highlighted the increased role that the Center needs to play in the area of
human/machine interfaces on current and future NASA programs.
While the Space Station program is not staffed with human factors engineers, the crew
systems and life sciences personnel perform this function at Level II with institutional
support from JSC. The Safety Office performs oversight of the function as a safety
concern.
Human factors requirements and their implementation are very high on the priority of
the Space Station Freedom program. Human factors requirements are embedded in the
SSP 30000, "Program Design Requirements Documents." Additionally, NASA Standard
30000, Volume IV, "Space Station Freedom Man-Systems Integration Standards,"
published by the JSC Crew Systems Division, is an applicable requirements document.
This document has recently been updated to add common EVA workstation interfaces.
The international partners have either accepted these requirements, or submitted their
own human factors requirements document(s) for meets-or-exceeds negotiation per
Memorandum of Understanding.
Implementation of these requirements is reviewed by several NASA groups, including
the Extravehicular Activity System (EVAS) Working Group and Freedom Safety Review
Panel. Mission Operations considers human factors when it reviews planned operations.
The Milestone Design Reviews also address human factors. Priority for the
implementation of commonality in design is based on the safety criticality of the
function. In some cases, the program has determined that a commonality of a function is
so critical that NASA makes its hardware available to the international partners. The
Space Station will continue to emphasize human factors considerations in its design.
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_: Independentverification and validation (IV&V) of large software systems
is consideredcritical to program success.There hasbeen someconfusionover the
IV&V activity for SSFPand the role of various groups in accomplishingit.
Recommendation #33: NASA should develop a clear definition of what is meant by
IV&V. This definition should encompass both the activities to be performed as part of
verification and validation and the degree of independence required.
NASA Re__onse: In NSTS 08271, "Flight Software Verification and Validation
Requirements," NASA formally defined an embedded process and requirements for the
Space Shuttle program. This process includes maintenance of many detailed test
procedures, and the SR&QA organization audits this process. NASA began a study to
evaluate this embedded process relative to the need for IV&V and coordinated this
activity with the National Research Council. Study results should be available in late
1993.
NASA will establish an IV&V facility in Fairmont, WV, later this year. At this facility,
NASA will develop an Agencywide IV&V capability and provide IV&V support to
programs, including Space Station. Through this effort, NASA will develop an
Agencywide IV&V policy, conduct IV&V research, demonstrate tool/technique
applications, and develop training requirements. The IV&V policy will include a clear
definition of IV&V, identify the essential IV&V activities, and state the relationship of
IV&V to other program activities.
SSP 30000, Section 12, paragraph 4.1.14, "Space Station Master Verification
Requirements," requires IV&V of all flight software that supports Category 1, 1C, and 2S
functions or is resident in Criticality 1 and 1R hardware. The program has been
performing the IV&V functions; however, the process has not been formalized. SSF has
utilized the Engineering Integration Contractor (EIC) as the program-level IV&V agent.
The EIC is totally independent of all software developers in the program and reports
directly to the Level II Program Office. Tasking is currently in place with EIC to
perform typical design Phase IV&V tasks.
Tasks performed by EIC during the requirements phase of the program were specifically
directed at requirement traceability analysis, review of requirements for consistency and
completion, and independent assessments involving system performance projections and
requirement correctness. The EIC has a track history of performing this IV&V function
in every major software review and has provided numerous independent assessments to
the Program Office. As the program enters the coding and test phases, new tasks will be
issued to the EIC to conduct independent tests of each flight load for certification for
flight readiness.
SSP 30666, Volume 4, Part 2, "Master Independent Verification and Validation Plan,"
will formally document this program-level software IV&V process. It should also be
noted that each work package prime contractor has a verification and validation
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organization independent of the software development organization to provide the IV&V
function at the work package level.
_: NASA research and test facilities are a national asset, key to the United
States' continuing leadership in space and aeronautics. Regrettably, some of the
infrastructure is not being adequately maintained, and the development of new, state-of-
the-art facilities has been lagging.
Recommendation #34: NASA should develop an integrated long-range infrastructure
plan that assures the maintenance of existing assets and develops new facilities to
continue American leadership in space and aeronautics research and development.
NASA Response: NASA has embarked on a comprehensive study to develop a
coordinated national plan for world-class aeronautical and space facilities that meets the
current and projected need for commercial and Government-sponsored research and
development, and for Government space operations. The plan will be coordinated with
the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Commerce,
Department of Transportation, and the National Science Foundation. Industry
representatives have been contacted to ensure that private-sector interests are
considered. The plan will address shortfalls in existing capability, new facility
requirements, and consolidation and phaseout of existing facilities. The development of
the Facility Plan will be accomplished by three task groups: Aeronautics R&D Facilities,
Space R&D Facilities, and Space Operations Facilities; all three of which are of interest
to constituencies in the private sector. The results of the study will be an essential
component of our internal planning to improve and continue to maintain our facilityinfrastructure.
l_ndin_ #35: The Tethered Satellite System deployment failed as a result of a field
modification that was improperly controlled and tested. The change review process
employed did not uncover the flaw.
Recommendation #35: NASA should increase its emphasis on complete system testing
when feasible. In addition, care should be exercised to ensure that changes to flight
systems between completion of the last total systems test and the flight of the equipment
are properly analyzed, controlled, and executed.
NASA Response: NASA agrees. The OSMA is developing a NMI, "Verification of
NASA Space Flight Systems." This NMI is applicable to NASA Headquarters and Field
Installations, both to activities performed at NASA facilities and those performed at
contractor sites in accordance with contract requirements. This NMI establishes policy
and responsibilities for verifying that NASA Space Flight Systems meet performance and
operational requirements. It includes requirements for verification program definition,
planning, implementation risk evaluation, and independent assessment. The NMI
specifically addresses problems like those encountered by the Tethered Satellite, by
stating that all configuration changes made subsequent to qualification or acceptance
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testing shall require a systemengineeringevaluation and requalification by the same
processinitially used.
/_,__: NASA has embraced the concept of Total Quality Management (TQM).
However, TQM implementation across NASA Centers and contractors appears to vary
from highly visible and apparently productive efforts to activities that seem to have more
form than substance.
R¢Commetutation #36: NASA should review its internal TQM program to assure that it
is properly structured as a support function and includes not only motivation, but also
appropriate leadership and training for both TQM instructors and hands-on employees.
NASA Response: NASA's Continual Improvement Office (Code T) is currently
completing efforts to provide planning for a structured implementation of TQM.
Coordination with points-of-contact at each NASA facility and outside industry experts
has been conducted, and a NASA-wide Implementation Plan has been written. The plan
provides for a phased program to examine established initiatives and approaches at all
NASA Centers, benchmark successful activity, coordinate a consensus commitment across
NASA, and achieve partnership working arrangement with outside organizations.
Contractor/NASA metrics, and an internal/external Supplier Ratings System (SRS) have
been developed using the guidelines and selected provisions of the Baldridge Award,
President Award, NASA Low Trophy, and other similar criteria. These measures will be
used to gauge the performance of NASA's Continual Improvement activities. Overall,
this effort will result in a network of leadership, support, and training that meets the
strategic goals and directions of the Agency.
_: The Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee has produced a report
entitled, "Strategic Considerations for Support of Humans in Space and Moon/Mlr)s., '
Exploration Missions (Life Sciences Research and Technology Program, Volume
This excellent report contains a series of recommendations relating to human exploration
in space that pinpoint areas that NASA should explore prior to embarking on extended-
duration space flight.
Recommendation//37: NASA should address the recommendations contained in the
referenced report in a timely fashion.
NASA Rcm_onse: The report entitled, "Strategic Considerations for Support of Humans
in Space and Moon/Mars Exploration Missions (Life Sciences Research and Technology
Program, Volume 1)," includes a timeline for implementing the recommendations. The
NASA Life Sciences organizations were an integral part of the Aerospace Medicine
Advisory Committee efforts to define both their recommendations and the timeline to
incorporate them. The Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
(Code U) incorporated those recommendations applicable to the life sciences, through
the definition of science priorities and their discipline plans, within the last 2 years.
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The report recommendationsrecognize that the space exploration program might be
deferred to a future date. The timeline for incorporating space exploration
recommendations will be modified to adapt to the goals of NASA.
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APPENDIX C
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL ACTIVITIES
JANUARY 1993 - JANUARY 1994
15
26
Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment, Marshall Space Flight Center
Assured Shuttle Availability Program Discussion with General Accounting
Office, NASA Headquarters
27
Space Shuttle Main Engine Assessment Presentation to NASA
Administrator, NASA Headquarters
_FEBRUARy
11
22-23
23 -25
STS-55 Flight Readiness Review, Kennedy Space Center
Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee Meeting, NASA Headquarters
Integrated Logistics Panel Meeting, Marshall Space Flight Center
MARCH
17
18
APRIL
21
22
23 -24
Space Shuttle, Space Station and Russian Program Briefings, NASA
Headquarters
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Meeting, NASA Headquarters
Auxiliary Power Unit Briefing, Sundstrand
Kennedy Space Center Operations Discussions, Kennedy Space Center
STS-55 L-2 and L-1 Day Review, Kennedy Space Center
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MAY
3
4-6
11
12
17
18
25-26
Space Station Redesign Presentation, Crystal City, VA
Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel Meeting, Tucson, AZ
Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine Firing and External Tank activities,
Stennis Space Center
External Tank Briefing, Martin Marietta, Michoud Assembly Facility
Pre-Congressional Testimony Briefing with Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report Congressional Testimony,
Washington, DC
Rocketdyne Procedures and Processes Study, Marshall Space Flight Center
15-16
22
25
28-29
Procedures and Processes Study, Rocketdyne
F-15B Advanced Flight Test Fixture Flight Readiness Review Aerodynamic
Flight Test, Dryden Flight Research Facility
National Research Council Committee Review of Space Shuttle Flight
Software Process, Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center Operations Review
LU__LX
13
14
15
21
22
Review of Flight Test Programs, Dryden Flight Research Facility
Orbiter 104 Review, Rockwell Palmdale Facility
Review of Orbiter Program Operations Safety Enhancements, Autoland,
Rockwell Downey
Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee Meeting, NASA Headquarters
X-31 Tactical Utility Testing Flight Readiness Review, Dryden Flight
Research Facility
C-2
AUGUST
19
26
Discussions concerning Rocketdyne Procedures and Processes Study; ASAP
Comments on General Accounting Office Space Shuttle Main Engine
Report; and Kennedy Space Center Processing Procedures with
Administrator, NASA Headquarters
Software Discussion/Teleconference with the Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance
8-9 Structured Surveillance Discussion, Kennedy Space Center
14-17 Integrated Logistics Panel Meeting, Kennedy Space Center
20 Rocketdyne Procedures and Processes for Space Shuttle Main Engine
Presentation to Senior Management, NASA Headquarters
23-24 Structured Surveillance, Kennedy Space Center
29-30 Space Shuttle Program, Russian Program, Hubble Program Reviews,
Johnson Space Center
OCTOBER
5
19-21
Awards Ceremony, NASA Headquarters
Software and Kennedy Space Center Processing Discussion with the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA Headquarters
Shuttle Processing Reviews, Kennedy Space Center
Software Discussion with the Offices of Safety and Mission Assurance, and
Space Flight, NASA Headquarters
NOVEMBER
2
16
Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine Program, Redesign Solid Rocket
Motor Program, Lightweight External Tank Program and Space Station
Alpha Program, Marshall Space Flight Center
Aeronautics Discussion with Associate Administrator for Aeronautics,
NASA Headquarters
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16 Flight Readiness Review on Use of Helmet Mounted Visual Audio
Display, Dryden Flight Research Facility
_MBER
9
15
16
High Altitude Unmanned Vehicle Hight Readiness Review, Dryden Flight
Research Facility
Total Quality Management Discussions with Associate Administrator for
Continual Improvement, NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Discussion with General Accounting Office, NASA
Headquarters
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